A Workable Substantive Due Process by Tymkovich, Timothy M et al.
Notre Dame Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 5 Article 5 
6-19-2020 
A Workable Substantive Due Process 
Timothy M. Tymkovich 
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
Joshua Dos Santos 
Juris Doctor, Stanford Law School; Law Clerk to the Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich; Law Clerk to the Hon. 
Raymond Kethledge 
Joshua J. Craddock 
Affiliated Scholar with the James Wilson Institute on National Rights and the American Founding; Juris 
Doctor, Harvard Law School; Law Clerk to the Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1961 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more 
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 1 10-JUN-20 15:08
A  WORKABLE  SUBSTANTIVE  DUE  PROCESS
Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich, Joshua Dos Santos & Joshua J. Craddock*
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1962 R
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “DUE PROCESS” UP TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1965 R
II. THE MANY FACES OF “DUE PROCESS” IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1972 R
A. What Process Is Due, Anyway? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1973 R
B. Liberty 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1977 R
C. When Officials Do Heinous Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1980 R
D. Other Kinds of Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1982 R
III. CONFUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1985 R
A. Which Due Process? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1985 R
B. Which Substantive Due Process? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989 R
C. What Kind of Right? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1993 R
1. Fundamental or Not? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1993 R
2. Solitary Silos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1997 R
3. Distinguishing Genuine Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998 R
IV. SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998 R
A. Creating A Due Process Flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1999 R
B. Clearly Established Unenumerated Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2004 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2010 R
© 2020 Timothy M. Tymkovich, Joshua Dos Santos & Joshua J. Craddock.  Individuals
and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any
format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the
authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the
copyright notice.
* Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.  I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Walter H Hawes IV, Law
Clerk to the Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich (2019).
Joshua Dos Santos, Juris Doctor, Stanford Law School (2017); Law Clerk to the Hon.
Timothy M. Tymkovich (2017); Law Clerk to the Hon. Raymond Kethledge (2018).
Joshua J. Craddock, Affiliated Scholar with the James Wilson Institute on National
Rights and the American Founding; Juris Doctor, Harvard Law School (2018); Law Clerk
to the Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich (2018).
1961
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 2 10-JUN-20 15:08
1962 notre dame law review [vol. 95:5
INTRODUCTION
It is now cliche´ to say that substantive due process is controversial.  Yet it
remains true that few legal doctrines have been more contentious in the last
century or so in American law.  It is also true, and not coincidentally, that this
area of law is not just one of the most contentious, but one of the most con-
fused.  This Article seeks not to add to the controversy, but to explain the
mire, and to propose a path across it.
The controversy stems from the judiciary’s interpretation of a brief, but
apparently capacious, phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment: “due process of
law.”1  Much has been said: the phrase’s original meaning is obvious;2 its
meaning is impossibly vague;3 it merely addressed historical ills;4 its very text
denounces any substantive component;5 its text connotes a substantive
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Bill of Rights and Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
417, 434 (The Due Process Clause “yield[s] [a] manageable, discrete meaning[ ] upon
historical investigation.”); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320–21 (1999).
3 See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30 (1958) (observing that the Due
Process Clauses are written “in such sweeping terms that their history does not elucidate
their contents”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 52
(2007) (describing “the original meaning of the Due Process Clauses” as “indeterminate”);
Arthur E. Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283, 286 (1965) (“[N]o one
knows precisely what the words ‘due process of law’ meant to the draftsmen of the fifth
amendment, and no one knows what these words meant to the draftsmen of the four-
teenth amendment.”).
4 See, e.g., Nathan Schlueter & Robert H. Bork, Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on
Abortion, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2003), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/01/002-con-
stitutional-persons-an-exchange-on-abortion (statements of Robert H. Bork).
5 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (“But any serious argument over the scope of the Due Process Clause must acknowl-
edge that neither its text nor its history suggests that it protects the many substantive rights
this Court’s cases now claim it does.”); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 40 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I believe that the Due Process Clause guarantees
no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process.”); Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654,
657 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., for the court) (describing substantive due process as
“an oxymoron” and procedural due process as “a redundancy”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (calling substantive due pro-
cess “a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness’”); Antonin Scalia,
Address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Constitutional Interpre-
tation the Old Fashioned Way (Mar. 14, 2005) (“Only lawyers can walk around talking
about substantive process, in as much as it’s a contradiction in terms.  If you referred to
substantive process or procedural substance at a cocktail party, people would look at you
funny.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-JUN-20 15:08
2020] a  workable  substantive  due  process 1963
requirement of justice;6 it incorporates cherished limits on the federal gov-
ernment and applies them to states;7 it incorporates nothing.8
This back and forth has surely had its benefits; it has caused us to think
more deeply about the role of the courts in our constitutional republic.  And
it has caused us to reevaluate our belief in democracy—to reaffirm our belief
in its virtues and necessity.
But one thing, we can all agree, has not been positive: the resulting con-
fusion about how courts are supposed to evaluate substantive due process
claims.  Battles often blur boundary lines.  This battle is no different.  No
sooner is one line drawn in the sand when its opponents’ counteroffensive
wipes it out—or, worst of all, wipes it out incompletely.  To put things plainly,
the controversial nature of substantive due process doctrine has made the
Supreme Court’s due process caselaw unclear.  A case might establish a prin-
ciple, but soon afterward that principle will be disavowed, nodded to without
compliance, or simply ignored.  The Court’s caselaw is, therefore, contradic-
tory, imprecise, and sometimes impossible to understand.  The inferior
courts are left surveying the battlefield with little to guide them.
The problem goes deeper, however.  Perhaps more problematically, dif-
ferent kinds of cases bearing the banner of substantive due process have
developed separately, with no semblance of connection or doctrinal equiva-
lence.  In part, this stems from imprecise language.  But it also has much to
do with courts’ natural tendency to resolve the cases before them without
identifying the relationship between the case at hand and the wider world of
substantive due process.  The results are siloed strands of substantive due
process caselaw, along with a hodgepodge of warring quotations and maxims
with uncertain authority.
All this leaves courts adrift.  It is not just that substantive due process
doctrine is messy.  It is that judges often don’t know what to do with a newly
asserted claim of substantive due process.  Should they use one of the
existing frameworks for substantive due process?  More than one?  If just one,
which?  Or maybe they should come up with a new test, as many cases seem
to have done?  There are no clear answers to these questions.
Courts are not likely to get the answers from litigants.  In substantive due
process cases, plaintiffs often allege they’ve been wronged grievously.  At this,
judges raise their eyebrows: “That sounds pretty bad,” they think, “but what’s
the law here?”  The briefs don’t help much because plaintiffs often brief all
6 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1333 (3d ed. 2000)
(“[T]here is a reasonable historical argument that, by 1868, a recognized meaning of the
qualifying phrase ‘of law’ was substantive.”).
7 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (“In resolving conflicting
claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increas-
ingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
8 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5–9,
18–19 (1989).
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sorts of different theories—the kitchen sink approach: “My case shocks the
conscience, but if that test doesn’t apply I have a fundamental right that’s
been infringed, and if that test doesn’t work out I also fit within this subspe-
cies of substantive due process, and if I don’t win that way,” and so on.  And if
the plaintiffs choose only one theory, the defendants are very likely to argue
that the plaintiffs’ chosen approach to substantive due process is not the cor-
rect one.  On and on it goes, with courts unsure what to do because caselaw
points every which way.
In this Article, we have three objectives.  First, we’d like to add our own
conceptualization of the various flavors of due process adjudication.  Our
aim here is not to add a new theory, but to explain what exists in new ways—
to put all the pieces of the due process puzzle together and explain how they
relate to each other.  To the surprise of some, perhaps, we find a small kernel
of originalist truth within current forms of substantive due process.  In short,
the “shocks the conscience” strand of substantive due process jurisprudence
prohibits some egregious torts by the state.  At a certain level of abstraction,
this approach can be squared with the original public meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause during ratification.
Second, we will explain the confusion currently overtaking the circuits.
The confusion we refer to is not about nitty-gritty details.  It is fundamental.
Courts do not know what law to apply to a given plaintiff’s claim under sub-
stantive due process doctrine.  There are two generic tests floating around—
the shocks-the-conscience test and the fundamental-rights test.  Courts disa-
gree about when each test applies.  Then there are more specific tests tai-
lored to particular contexts, like pretrial detention.  No one knows whether
these more specific tests apply exclusively, or whether they apply in addition
to one or both generic ones.  Our goal here is to explain the debate.
Last, we will propose two solutions.  Looking to the history of Due Pro-
cess Clause jurisprudence, as well as to the Supreme Court’s stated policy
concerns in this area, we propose dividing substantive due process into (1)
cases challenging legislative action, (2) cases challenging executive action,
and (3) cases challenging judicial action (though those distinctions them-
selves will require line drawing).  In those challenging legislative action,
plaintiffs must show the law impermissibly or irrationally burdens a funda-
mental right.  In cases challenging executive action, plaintiffs must show they
were deprived of a liberty or property interest in such an egregious fashion
that the conduct shocks the conscience of federal judges.  The shocks-the-
conscience formulation is not to be an empty phrase, though.  In each con-
text, courts should specify the factors that make a case conscience shocking.
In fact, we argue that this is what the more specific tests have already done.
What has been unclear until now is that many of the cases creating more
specific tests for substantive due process violations are simply manifestations
of the shocks-the-conscience approach.  Finally, in cases challenging judicial
action, a state court decision will violate substantive due process only if it is
an “arbitrary or capricious” abuse of power.
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We separately propose repackaging and relaunching the Glucksberg “fun-
damental rights” test.  Rather than defining a right in the abstract and bal-
ancing interests, we propose asking whether a law clearly violates a settled
tradition or norm.
To explain all this, though, we must begin at the beginning.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “DUE PROCESS” UP TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
If you are lost, it is often best to retrace your steps.  Before turning to the
ongoing substantive due process confusion, then, a brief history of due pro-
cess doctrine is in order.  As routinely told, the history of “due process” as a
concept begins in England.  Chapter 29 of Magna Carta provided that “[n]o
free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any
way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers [or/and] by the
law of the land.”9  In other words, when it came to punishment, no regal
whims were allowed: the punishments listed could not be imposed without a
jury, and to effect them the Crown had to comply with the “law of the land.”
The law of the land, at this time, had two specific components: the common
law—accumulated by careful reasoning from time immemorial and depen-
dent on specific, procedural writs—and the acts of Parliament.10
Eventually, Magna Carta’s guarantee of the Crown’s compliance with the
law of the land came to be known as “due process of law.”  That phrase first
appears in a 1354 statute that did not mention Magna Carta, but by 1642 Sir
Edward Coke had concluded that “due process of law” was just another way
of stating that well-known Magna Carta guarantee.11
Before continuing down the historical trail, it is worth pausing to call
attention to this particular meaning of the words “due process of law.”
Under this view, all “due process” guarantees is that the government will fol-
low the strictures of existing law before depriving one of life, liberty, or prop-
erty.  It does not necessarily mean the government must follow fair
procedures before doing so, only that the government must follow whatever
procedures are called for by law.  (There were perhaps one or two proce-
dures even Coke believed the government could not remove, but by and
large “due process” simply meant compliance with law.)12  In short, no arbi-
trary executive or judicial deprivations.  We call this the commonsense
reading.
Skipping to the American Founding, all agree the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause was supposed to incorporate this Magna Carta guarantee
9 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1682 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Magna Carta, c. 29
(1215), reprinted in A.E DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964)).
10 Id. at 1683, 1685.
11 See 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, E. & R.
Brooke 1797); Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1682–83.
12 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 428–32 (2010).
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of compliance with the law of the land.  But, perhaps unsurprisingly, what
Americans in 1789 thought of as “due process of law” may not have been the
same as what their cousins across the pond thought.  Much ink has thus been
dedicated to refining just what “due process of law” meant to the Founders.13
Coke is a key figure here.  His ideas formed “a chief source of early
American constitutionalism.”14  Since it seems plausible to attribute Coke’s
views to those of our Constitution’s Framers, there is debate about what
Coke’s precise formulation of “due process of law” was.  In particular, did
Coke think of the “law of the land” as including some kind of higher, “funda-
mental law”—law that even Parliament could not transgress?  If so, this would
make Coke’s conception of due process a kind of substantive limit on law as
well as a guarantee of compliance with law.  Some have read Coke’s commen-
tary and decisions to say exactly that.15  Others disagree.16
While the bulk of scholarship concludes Coke did not incorporate
higher law into his definition of due process of law,17 there is strong evidence
the Framers understood due process to include substantive limits on laws
passed by the legislature.  In part, the Framers did hold the commonsense
interpretation.  As due process of law was commonly understood before the
Founding, neither king nor Parliament could deprive someone of life, lib-
erty, or property except through a common-law court so deciding by applying
settled law.18  That is, the deprivation could only be authorized by valid law
already existing at the time of the deprivation.  By itself, this is a minimal
substantive requirement, of course.19
But Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have persuasively argued
the Framers of the original Constitution also understood due process to
impose a stronger, and substantive, limitation on legislatures: legislatures
could not, consistent with due process, authorize other branches of govern-
ment to deprive others of property without adjudication by a common-law
13 See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224–27 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1245–48 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Evan D. Bernick, Optimizing the Oxymoron: Substantive Due Process Justice Thomas Could Love,
26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 19–23), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255717; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of
Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment,
58 EMORY L.J. 585, 640–45 (2009); Williams, supra note 12, at 428–54; Christopher Wolfe,
The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 213, 213–32 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991).
14 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1684.
15 See id. at 1689–90. See generally Gedicks, supra note 13.
16 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1688; Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance
and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 94–98.
17 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1690; Easterbrook, supra note 16, at
96–97.
18 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1683, 1688.
19 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 984 (2006).
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court, nor could they deprive specific individuals of rights or property—the
latter being a violation of the separation of powers.20
This is not to say the Founders had anything like a modern notion of
“substantive due process”—which places a number of nonprocedural rights
beyond the legislature’s power to regulate.  But the Founders did believe due
process required more than executive compliance with the law on the books.
Rather, Americans tended to think legislatures had to comply with the “law of
the land,” and to them, the “law of the land” included common-law procedu-
ral protections.  Indeed, some of the American Revolutionaries’ principal
objections to Parliament’s legislation came wrapped in this theory of due
process.21  Parliament, they thought, could not abrogate common-law protec-
tions, as those were the (unalterable) law of the land, the basic Rights of
Englishmen.  And various state court cases held legislative acts incompatible
with the law of the land because they either (1) allowed the executive to
deprive persons of property without adjudication by a common law court, or
(2) directly deprived specific individuals of property.  To Americans, the lat-
ter was legislative usurpation of the judicial power.  And that violated the
separation of powers, a rule that they thought indispensable for any scheme
to bear the name “due process of law.”22
State court interpretations of due process pretty much followed these
lines for the first century or so of the republic.23  Then, in Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.24—the first Supreme Court case to exten-
sively define the contours of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause25—
the Court knit together these views into a historical interpretation of the
Clause.  The Court decided, in line with the bulk of state decisions, that “due
process” included not just the commonsense textual interpretation, but also
a substantive limit on how much the legislature could tinker with established
procedural protections.
As Justice Curtis put it, the Due Process Clause clearly placed limits on
Congress; it did not leave “the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised.”26  To figure out what those limits were, though, the Court
defined its mission as essentially historical, looking to “settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England,
before the emigration of our ancestors.”27  But, given that Americans during
the Founding had formed their own flavor of due process that had not pre-
cisely matched England’s, the Court restricted which “settled usages” of
20 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1679.
21 See id. at 1681–82.
22 See id. at 1678 n.12, 1717, 1721–26, 1742.
23 See id. at 1740–54.
24 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
25 The Supreme Court first considered the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
three years earlier in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). See Williams,
supra note 12, at 466.
26 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
27 Id. at 277.
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England would define due process: only those “not . . . unsuited to” the
American “civil and political condition.”28  A simple metric would determine
whether English usages and modes of proceedings continued to suit the
American republic: whether the states had continued to use them in their
colonial governments.29  This should sound familiar to anyone acquainted
with substantive due process jurisprudence.  It was the beginning of the “look
at what all the states do” approach.
But Murray’s Lessee arrived late on the scene, so to speak.  Within a few
years of its publication, the scourge of civil war would gut the nation.  Having
weathered a mortal threat against the nation as such, a victorious North
would push adoption of a new due process clause for the union—this time in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and this time, restricting
the states themselves.  It is this due process clause the Supreme Court would
read to include a series of fundamental rights unrelated to procedure over
the ensuing decades.  Ironically, then, the Supreme Court interpreted “due
process” by reference to the Founding, just before the nation-shaking events
that would eventually lead to interpretations of the phrase that would have
been unrecognizable to the Founders.
Let us turn to those nation-shaking events.  By the time of the Civil War,
slavery had been the country’s most heated political dispute for nearly three
decades.  It remained so when, after the war, the country had to ask: “Where
do we go from here?”  Never before had abolitionists seen such a clear oppor-
tunity to stamp out this “peculiar institution” once and for all.  They took it,
and the Thirteenth Amendment became law.
Unsurprisingly, though, the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery did
not change the condition of black persons in the South overnight.  Southern
states enacted the Black Codes—subjecting black persons to what was essen-
tially a caste system.  The Codes limited the rights of black persons as com-
pared to the rest of the state’s residents simply because they were black, thus
keeping them in servitude  in almost all but name.  Their travel was
restricted, their property rights practically nonexistent.  They could not sue
whites in court.  They could not testify.30
Yet for many black persons, the code books were the least of their wor-
ries.  Widespread mob violence and lynching made for an uneasy existence,
not only for blacks, but also for Northern Republicans who ventured south.
And though not authorized by any code provision, state-sanctioned mob jus-
tice routinely denied black persons accused of crimes any semblance of a fair
proceeding.31
These were the facts enraging the North when talk began of proposing a
new constitutional amendment.  The history of the Fourteenth Amend-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 277, 279.
30 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 118; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 44–46
(1976); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 102–03 (2011).
31 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 118; STUNTZ, supra note 30, at 102–04.
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ment—the congressional debates, the ratification debates, what constituents
wrote their representatives, what the newspapers said—is extensive and well
documented.  But for all the data collected, there are few answers.   We will
here provide a brief glimpse as to what is known about the Fourteenth
Amendment’s passage generally.  We will not restrict our attention to the
Due Process Clause.  For reasons that will become evident later, the history of
the rest of Section One—the Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular—
are important in understanding the judiciary’s expansive interpretation of
the Due Process Clause later.
On to what is known about the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in
general.  We know the Fourteenth Amendment came about at a peak of
Republican rhetoric about natural rights, natural law, and justice.32  Republi-
cans often spoke of God-given rights, of rights inherent to American republi-
canism, and of rights in positive law.  We know many spoke of the
Amendment as if it constitutionalized natural rights.33  We know many exco-
riated the Black Codes’ caste system as a violation of natural rights.  And we
know the Amendment was intentionally redrafted to be judicially enforcea-
ble, rather than enforceable only by Congress (though they did not seem
concerned with how the Court would interpret the vague provisions of Sec-
tion One).34  But we know in sum that some evidence points toward an
expansive Fourteenth Amendment, other evidence toward a narrow one.35
This leaves us with few, if any, answers to specific questions about application.
At the same time, senators, representatives, newspapers, and ratification
delegates did ask many of the specific questions courts would later ask.
Though they did not resolve these questions, their questions carry informa-
tion in themselves.  Would this Amendment’s broad language mark the end
of segregation and laws against interracial marriage?  Some thought yes.36
Others, no.37  Similarly, some argued the Amendment enforced the Bill of
Rights against the states.38  Yet after ratification, none of the Northern states
altered their laws to comply with the Bill of Rights.  For example, no state
adopted a grand jury requirement after ratification, even though the Fifth
Amendment requires it.39
Perhaps the most important discussion at the time, and still most impor-
tant to us now, was the question of what happened to state regulatory power
after the Amendment.  Would this Amendment not, by giving Congress
power to enforce rights as it saw fit, strip states of much of their regulatory
32 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 16–25, 36–39, 64–74 (1988).
33 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 25–26; NELSON, supra note 32, at 85–86.
34 See NELSON, supra note 32, at 58, 63, 145–46.
35 See id. at 143 (“Charles Sumner, for one, noted that it was like a sign on a highway
with different inscriptions on each side, so that people approaching the sign from opposite
directions necessarily read it differently.”).
36 See id. at 85, 107, 133.
37 See id. at 135–36, 154–55.
38 See id. at 154–55.
39 See id. at 117–18.
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power?  So asked many skeptical of the Amendment.  No, came the reply.
Most advocates answered that the Amendment conferred only equal state-law
rights and did not create any substantive rights.40  Indeed, it seems clear that
federalism remained a cherished constitutional principle at the time, and few
desired greater federal powers at the expense of the states.41
But, some observers asked, what did the Privileges or Immunities Clause
mean, then?  According to the Equal Protection Clause, states could not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws”42—did this language not mean that states could not differentiate
between black and white citizens?  Why then, did the Amendment also have
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which says states cannot “make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens?”43
What did this clause mean if it did not grant substantive rights?  In response
to this question, some stuck to the “equality only” explanation.  Others
attempted a different explanation: that states had full power to define rights,
but once they did, they could not deny any person those rights.44
But, some again asked, wasn’t this last concern taken care of by the Due
Process Clause—under which states would not be able to “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law?”45  If the problem was
that states did not afford black persons and northerners the procedures
promised in the law books—affording them mob justice instead—wouldn’t
the Due Process Clause already prohibit that?  Why the need for the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause?
Some admitted the Fourteenth Amendment protected fundamental
rights.46  But more came up with complex ways to explain why the Privileges
or Immunities Clause differed from the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses without granting substantive rights.47  The specifics are not as impor-
tant as the conclusions: these persons argued that states would retain full
power to define rights under state law.  They said that the Amendment did
not guarantee substantive rights, or if it did, it only guaranteed a very limited
set.48
Indeed, some said the only rights guaranteed were those thought to be
included in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause—which most lead-
ing legal scholars had concluded prevented states from disparaging the fun-
damental rights of out-of-state citizens within their borders.49  For example,
40 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 72; NELSON, supra note 32, at 115–17.
41 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 18–19, 50–53; NELSON, supra note 32, at 9.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43 Id.; see NELSON, supra note 32, at 60–61.
44 See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1414–22, 1466–69 (1992).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see NELSON, supra note 32, at 57.
46 See NELSON, supra note 32, at119.
47 See id. at 119–24.
48 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 81; NELSON, supra note 32, at 10, 79–85.
49 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (Washing-
ton, J.) (“The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
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North Carolina could not take away the right of a Virginia citizen to travel or
access courts when within North Carolina’s borders.  But Article IV said noth-
ing about the minimum rights a state had to provide its own citizens.  Under
this theory, then, the Fourteenth Amendment required states to extend to
their own citizens the Article IV rights they were required to provide to citi-
zens of other states.
Which of these theories the ratifiers believed is anyone’s guess.  We thus
have few concrete answers to questions about what the Amendment meant to
voters at the time—at least when it comes to specific applications.  It seems
that, for many, the Amendment might have been a general moral statement.
Few thought of the specifics of legal application, and of the few who did,
none resolved the questions.50  The debate rages on today.
But one thing is clear from those otherwise equivocal pages of history.
The debates almost entirely ignored the Due Process Clause.  In fact, the Due
Process Clause was added late in the drafting process.51  It was the Privileges
or Immunities Clause that engendered the most talk, if not concern.  Most
people seemed to have thought “due process of law” had a readily defined
legal meaning.  As Representative John Bingham said when asked about the
meaning of the Due Process Clause—an answer now repeated in practically
every history of the Amendment—“the courts have settled [the meaning of
due process of law] long ago, and the gentleman can go and read their deci-
sions.”52  It could be the drafters simply meant to incorporate the Magna
Carta–style guarantee against executive or judicial deprivations of life and
property that had no basis in law.53
Applying this settled concept of due process to the states seems to have
been uncontroversial.  Republicans were, after all, trying to remedy the bla-
tant denial of any process to many black persons and northerners in the
South.54  Nobody in Congress or the ratifying conventions espoused an inter-
pretation of “due process” that was at odds with the prevailing interpretation
of the states’ own due process provisions.  Nor did anyone suggest anything
states?  We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immu-
nities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign.  What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 674 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“The intention of this clause was
to confer on them, if one may say so, a general citizenship; and to communicate all the
privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under
the like circumstances.”); see also Harrison, supra note 44, at 1398–1401.
50 See NELSON, supra note 32, at 89–90.
51 See id. at 57.
52 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1726 (alteration in original) (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)).
53 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 145; NELSON, supra note 32, at 57.
54 See STUNTZ, supra note 30, at 102–04.
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remotely close to modern “substantive due process.”55  Today, some interpret
a few stray statements to mean something like substantive due process, but
even if those statements came close to a theory of substantive due process,
such a theory would have been an isolated view.56  Still others point to a few
state cases preceding the Amendment that had a streak of substantive due
process to them.  Yet there is no evidence the Amendment’s drafters and
ratifiers agreed with those cases.57
From this exceedingly truncated recounting, we can glean two insights.
First, the best historical interpretation of the Due Process Clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment is probably that state governments could not deprive per-
sons of life, liberty, or property without complying at a minimum with their
own standing laws, as well as the settled procedures of English common law,
as adopted and practiced by the American colonies.  That was the reigning
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause at the time, and
the interpretation many state courts had given to their own due process
clauses too.  We will call this the orthodox historical interpretation.
Second, while the ratifiers did not debate the Due Process Clause’s
meaning, and likely did not conceive of due process as a source of non-
procedural rights, they did debate whether other parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment granted persons substantive rights that states could not abridge.
In other words, it could be argued (and was argued) that the Fourteenth
Amendment—in particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause—granted
substantive rights, though only a limited variety.58  In time, the Supreme
Court would import a more extreme version of this idea into the Due Process
Clause.  It would be through the Due Process Clause, and not the more his-
torically fitting Privileges or Immunities Clause, that the Supreme Court
would find substantive rights that states cannot abridge—part of what we now
call “substantive due process.”
II. THE MANY FACES OF “DUE PROCESS” IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Once the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, a long process of
interpretation began—with the Due Process Clause having the most varie-
gated history.
Up to this point, we have seen two interpretations of due process.  First,
the commonsense one from Magna Carta: the executive can only deprive
someone of life, liberty, or property through application of existing law and
procedure.  Second, the historical one based on Americans’ understanding
of due process at the time of the Founding and repeated in many state court
decisions: neither the executive nor the legislature can deprive a person of
life, liberty, or property without the procedural protections of English com-
mon law as incorporated in the new states.  We should note that this second
55 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1677, 1679–80.
56 See, e.g., id. at 1716–17.
57 See id. at 1777–78.
58 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 31.
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interpretation did not eliminate the first.  It only added to the first.  That is, by
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, both the commonsense and the
orthodox historical interpretations enjoyed popularity.
So how do we get from these interpretations to striking down laws as
violating notions of privacy or personal autonomy?  The answer is abstrac-
tion.  The history of due process is a history of step after step toward an
increasingly abstract notion of what due process means.  The concept was
first abstracted from text to a historical proposition.  Next, from historical
proposition to core principle of procedural justice.  And finally, from core
principle of procedural justice, to core principle of justice in general.
The same principle of abstraction holds for the definition of the rights
of life, liberty, and property.  As creative as one wishes to get with the defini-
tion of “fair process,” one cannot get to the expansive decisions in the
Court’s repertoire without a broad definition of “liberty” and “property.”
Indeed, had the Court simply defined “liberty” as freedom from physical con-
finement in a jail, it would be hard to imagine much controversy—or civil
litigation—in this area of law.
So, there are two interpretive moves to keep track of: (1) more and
more abstract interpretations of what “due process” means, and (2) broader
and broader interpretations of what “liberty” includes.
A. What Process Is Due, Anyway?
We have already seen how the courts took the first step toward a more
abstract definition of the words “due process.”  They went from the common-
sense, literal interpretation to a historical one: due process protects the pro-
cedural protections Americans have cherished for over hundreds of years.
This move had, as we have seen, a solid historical foundation.  There is good
evidence the Founders thought of due process in this way.
About twenty years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the
Supreme Court took its second step toward abstraction.  The case was
Hurtado v. California.59  The question: Does the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause require states to use grand juries to bring felony charges?
The Court held no, but its dicta is far more important here than the particu-
lars of this holding.  The Supreme Court of California had interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to mean the commonsense
textual interpretation: due process only required the state to abide by
existing law.  Since the indictment at issue met all the strictures of California
law, it could not violate due process.60
The Court’s opinion pitted this commonsense textual interpretation
against the orthodox historical interpretation, seeming to side with the com-
monsense approach.  The Court then mounted a full siege of the orthodox
historical interpretation.61  The Court noted that a number of recent deci-
59 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
60 Id. at 520–21.
61 See id. at 527–35.
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sions by both state supreme courts and the Supreme Court had applied the
commonsense interpretation to state due process clauses.  And even Lord
Coke’s writings did not necessarily mean that “due process of law” required
compliance with particular modes of English procedure.62  More than that,
why should history determine the meaning of due process?  The clause’s pur-
pose was surely to preclude procedural arbitrariness, not enshrine the proce-
dures of the past.63
Here, the Court prepared to strike the jugular of the historical interpre-
tation.  Why should English law determine American procedural standards
when America differed to such a great extent from its former parent?  Parlia-
ment is for the most part supreme in Britain, for instance, whereas American
legislatures do not boast boundless power.64  To the extent Murray’s Lessee
might have seemed to adopt the orthodox historical interpretation for the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court read Murray’s Lessee simply
to hold that traditional procedures satisfy due process but not that due pro-
cess requires traditional procedures.65  Why should tradition hamstring new
experiences and experimentation—“stamp[ing] upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians”?66
Indeed, should we once again throw the accused bound hand and foot into
water and see if he floats, as tradition preferred some time ago?67
With this almost cheeky tone, the Court did away with any historical fet-
ter.  Tradition did not bind states; they could alter the common law as they
wished.68  Yet that did not leave states totally unbounded.  “[I]t is not to be
supposed that these legislative powers are absolute and despotic, and that the
amendment prescribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite to
operate as a practical restraint.”69  Due process is a “bulwark[ ] . . . against
arbitrary legislation” as well as “executive usurpation and tyranny.”70  “It is
not every act, legislative in form, that is law.  Law is something more than
mere will exerted as an act of power.”71  “Arbitrary power,” in fact, “is not
law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an imper-
sonal multitude.”72  “The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process
is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of individu-
als and minorities,” against both “the power of numbers” and “the violence of
public agents transcending the limits of lawful authority, even when acting in
the name and wielding the force of the government.”73  Indeed, the Court
62 Id. at 521–24.
63 See id. at 527–31.
64 See id. at 529–31.
65 Id. at 528.
66 Id. at 529.
67 See id. at 530.
68 See id. at 535.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 532.
71 Id. at 535.
72 Id. at 536.
73 Id.
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went on, unless some fundamental rights are outside the control of the state,
government is but despotism.74
Now we are getting close to twentieth century concept of substantive due
process.  But we are not there yet.  For all its language about limits on state
legislative power, the Hurtado Court was still concerned with procedural rights,
not other kinds of rights.  Its reasoning took a step into abstraction but did
not go all the way.  Tradition was not binding because the point of due pro-
cess was not to uphold tradition but to ensure that government does not
deprive persons of life, liberty, and property arbitrarily.  But the Court said
nothing about nonprocedural rights.  Thus, the Court’s procedural
conclusion:
It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, [1]
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or [2] newly devised in the discretion of
the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to
be due process of law.75
So, whether traditional or new, a state’s procedural law must conform to
“principles of liberty and justice.”  The question is not whether the state’s
procedures violate historical procedural protections.  It is whether the state’s
procedures are arbitrary.
In retrospect, looking at Hurtado’s expansive language, the jump to judi-
cial review of arbitrary nonprocedural law seems like it would be easy.  And easy
it was.  Before the end of the nineteenth century, the Court issued several
decisions flatly stating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause pro-
tected nonprocedural rights, too.76
But the Court did not repeat that here, exactly.  Instead, it proceeded in
two stages.  First, the Court said the “liberty” and “property” protected by the
Due Process Clause includes natural liberties—for example, the right “to fol-
low any of the ordinary callings of life.”77  And then, the Court said any law
that unduly interferes with those rights cannot be “due process of law.”78
In many opinions, the Court did not spell out its reasoning.  Indeed, its
reasoning was sometimes inscrutable.  In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,79 for example,
the Court held that a state could not prevent execution of a contract entered
into under the laws of a different state.  The court explained that executing
the contract was “a proper act . . . which the defendants were at liberty to
perform and which the state legislature had no right to prevent . . .  [under]
the Federal Constitution.”80  Why was this?  Why did such an act violate the
74 See id. at 536–37.
75 Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
76 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678, 684 (1888).
77 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590 (quoting Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
78 Id. at 591.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 591.
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Due Process Clause?  The Court responded with tautology: “To deprive the
citizen of such a right as herein described without due process of law is ille-
gal.  Such a statute as this in question is not due process of law, because it
prohibits an act which under the Federal Constitution the defendants had a
right to perform.”81
Realizing those two declarative sentences dropped an anvil on state legis-
lative power, the Court followed the tautology with a paradox, the kind of
paradox that says “I am not saying X, but I am saying X.”  “This does not
interfere in any way”—the Court declared, perhaps blushing—“with the
acknowledged right of the State to enact such legislation in the legitimate
exercise of its police or other powers as to it may seem proper.”82  But then
again, the Court admitted, “this” sort of does interfere with legislative power:
“In the exercise of such [legislative] right, however, care must be taken not to
infringe upon those other rights of the citizen which are protected by the
Federal Constitution.”83
The point is not to pick on a Supreme Court struggling to give effect to a
capacious new Amendment.  It is first to foreshadow the lack of clarity that
plagues Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence—that has
plagued it from the beginning.  Second, it is simply to highlight how quickly
the Court abstracted to a much broader conception of due process of law—a
conception not only concerned with the executive’s faithfulness to standing
law before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property (as the common-
sense, textual, Magna Carta interpretation would hold), or with the legisla-
ture’s enactment of fair procedural statutes that comport with traditional
protections (as the orthodox historical approach in the United States had
held).  Instead, the Court was concerned also with the reasonableness of the
legislative process itself.
Let us dwell on this thought further.  It explains, in our view, the
Supreme Court’s apparent tautology in Allgeyer.  Up until this point, due pro-
cess jurisprudence had focused on compliance with or the adequacy of pro-
cedural legislation.  But in Allgeyer and cases like it, the Court turned its
attention to the adequacy of the legislative process itself.  The Due Process
Clause would not only prohibit legislatures from churning out wildly unfair
procedural statutes.  It would also require the legislative process to be a rea-
sonable process with respect to any legislation.  Whenever the legislature
touched on the liberty and property of the citizen (which, let’s face it, is
almost always), its acts had to be reasonable.  If its acts were not reasonable,
then the legislative process itself must have fallen short somehow—and an
unreasonable legislative process, as the Allgeyer Court said, is not the process
due to the people writ large.
This interpretative move is yet another step further into abstraction.
The reasoning goes something like this: (1) due process protects against
unfair procedures; (2) by protecting against unfair procedures, due process
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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really means to protect against arbitrariness in procedure; (3) since the Due
Process Clause protects against arbitrariness in procedure, then it must also
protect against arbitrariness in the legislative process; (4) legislation that
unreasonably burdens liberty or property must only come from an arbitrary
legislative process; (5) therefore, the Due Process Clause protects against leg-
islation that unreasonably or arbitrarily burdens liberty or property.
This same logic leads to rational-basis review under the Due Process
Clause.  Since all legislation will curtail some aspect of natural liberty, then all
legislation must be reasonable.  Hence the rule that all legislation must be
reasonably related to a legitimate end.84
To our knowledge, this explicit line of reasoning has rarely, if ever,
appeared in the Court’s decisions.  It is, however, the best explanation able
to tie Allgeyer and other decisions striking down nonprocedural statutes to the
text of the Due Process Clause.  Even if this interpretation is far-fetched and
untethered to the historical meaning of “due process” as a term of art, it at
least softens the charge made by many: that an interpretation of due process
that allows courts to strike down nonprocedural laws must be flatly inconsis-
tent with the ordinary meaning of the word “process.”85
In any event, by effectively applying the requirement of fair process to
the legislative process itself, the Court began reviewing legislation for its rea-
sonableness. Lochner v. New York86 is the most-cited early example of this line
of cases.  In Lochner, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute
restricting the number of hours bakers could work.87  The act interfered with
the bakers’ natural right to contract for labor, and the Court thought, did so
for no good reason.  Under our explanation here, we might say the Court
thought the legislative process had malfunctioned by producing that “unrea-
sonable” legislation.
Hence the fears some articulated during the Amendment’s ratification
came true.  State legislatures would now sit as pupils of the federal govern-
ment, which would now watchfully ensure they crossed their t’s and dotted
their i’s and would require work to be shown for any arithmetic.  It is just that
the courts took up the role of master, not Congress.
B. Liberty 2.0
But, as already mentioned, a more abstract interpretation of the words
“due process” does not suffice to produce substantive due process’s most
famous decisions: Lochner, Griswold, Roe, Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell.  In
addition to a more capacious definition of process—one that includes the
legislative process itself—one needs a more capacious definition of “liberty”
and “property.”
84 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
85 See e.g., ELY, supra note 5, at 18.
86 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
87 Id. at 64.
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This ingredient was not long in coming either.  As already explained,
before the Court turned the corner into the twentieth century, it had already
found that the “liberty” mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment included
such rights as the right “to follow any of the ordinary callings of life.”88  In
effect, the Court opened the door for “liberty” to include as many natural or
civil rights as the Court wished to recognize.
Now, as a purely textual matter, the foregoing might be a permissible
way to interpret the word “liberty”—so long as one ignores the historical
meaning of “liberty” in similar due process clauses (and ignores the nearby
Privileges or Immunities Clause).  Yet, as the standard story goes, the word
“liberty” was probably not rendered so expansive through a free-going,
“words-alone” interpretive method.  One must recall now the history of the
rest of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section One.
During drafting and ratification, some believed the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause in Section One placed certain natural and civil rights beyond
the state’s regulatory power.  Those rights included, some said, the Bill of
Rights.  Nobody mentioned the possibility that the Due Process Clause did
the same.  Yet by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court had said
the Due Process Clause did so, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause did
not.89  How did that happen?
The short, almost-caricatured answer is this: an early Supreme Court
decision killed the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the dissenters used
the Due Process Clause to loot its grave.  In the Slaughter-House Cases90 in
1873—one of the first decisions to construe the Fourteenth Amendment—
Justice Miller’s majority opinion held that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause only protected rights that owe their existence to the federal govern-
ment: in effect, only a small collection of federal rights like the right to travel,
not natural or state-law rights like the right to contract or to security in one’s
property.91  In doing so, the Court made the Privileges or Immunities Clause
superfluous, since the preamended Constitution already prohibited states
from interfering with federal rights.92  Whatever the flaws in the majority’s
interpretation, though, it did recognize a historical point that is likely true:
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers generally did not wish to vastly
increase federal power at the expense of the states.93
In any event, the majority’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases sparked
several forceful dissents.  Justice Bradley’s dissent, for example, argued the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did recognize substantive rights.94  In addi-
88 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590 (quoting Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
89 See BERGER, supra note 8, at 31.
90 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
91 See id. at 74–78; see also NELSON, supra note 32, at 163.
92 See NELSON, supra note 32, at 162–64.
93 See id. at 164.
94 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 121–22 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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tion, Justice Bradley explained that the Due Process Clause protects against
legislation that infringes liberty or property without adequate justification.95
As we have seen, this latter theory prevailed.  Though the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not, and still does not, provide substantive rights, the
Due Process Clause made up the deficiency.
Yet plundering the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s tomb for shiny new
Due Process Clause rights against the state was not seamless.  The story of the
first major backlash is often told.  In Lochner and cases like it, the Supreme
Court struck down economic legislation because it unreasonably (as the
Court saw it) infringed on economic liberty, and therefore deprived persons
of liberty without “due process of law.”  We must pause here to note that the
decisions making the most splash enforced economic rights against the fed-
eral government—thus interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, not the Fourteenth’s.96  And in the bowels of the Great Depression,
the President, and many in Congress, believed the Court was hamstringing
the other branches’ ability to deal with economic crises.97
Eventually, the Court reneged.98  It buried the economic rights it had
only recently dug up beneath a new doctrine: preferred rights theory.  Under
this theory, some rights were more important than others.  This itself is not
really groundbreaking.  It is part of the same natural-rights reasoning that led
to the enforcement of economic rights.  It was a new conclusion, not a new
methodology, that changed things: economic rights, the Court decided, were
not among those important rights the Due Process Clause protects.  In some
sense, then, economic rights were buried with the same shovel the Court dug
them up with.
But the Court kept the shovel.  For a while, Lochner-talk hung over the
Court like flood lights.  And for that while, the Court did not venture to
creative new grounds to dig up brand new rights.  It did, however, continue
to dig in familiar territory, through the incorporation doctrine.
Incorporation doctrine is not a separate aspect of the Due Process
Clause.  It is the very thing we have been talking about: finding natural and
civil rights included in the “liberty” the Due Process Clause protects.99  From
95 See id. at 122–23.
96 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
97 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Three Hundredth Press Conference (Excerpts)
(June 2, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 191, 192
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938) (accusing the Court of creating a “‘no-man’s-land’ where
no Government—State or Federal—can function”); see also United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935) (holding provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional).
98 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
99 Incorporation through the Due Process Clause is itself controversial as an original
matter. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805–58 (2010) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the individual rights protected
in the Bill of Rights are incorporated through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the
Due Process Clause).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-JUN-20 15:08
1980 notre dame law review [vol. 95:5
the late nineteenth century to the present day the Court has been picking
and choosing civil rights from the Bill of Rights that it believes fundamental
enough for the Due Process Clause to guard against the states.  The reason
for that is simple: so long as we are looking for fundamental rights enshrined
in tradition, the Bill of Rights seems a great place to look.  So while the Court
did not again find new natural or civil rights in the Due Process Clause until
the 1960s, it did continue recognizing some rights from the Bill of Rights as
rights the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects.100
Eventually, though, the Lochner flood lights dimmed, and the Court
again felt free to go find some really new rights. Griswold v. Connecticut101
came first in 1965.  The Court explicitly rejected the Lochner approach to
finding new Due Process Clause rights, yet went on to find a right to contra-
ception use by implication from the provisions of the Bill of Rights.  In effect,
the Griswold Court engaged in the same old activity: looking around—
whether in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere—for rights important enough for
the Due Process Clause to protect.  Indeed, Justice Goldberg’s concurrence
said so explicitly.102
After Griswold came Roe v. Wade,103 Lawrence v. Texas,104 and most
recently, Obergefell v. Hodges.105  These decisions all identify rights included
within the Due Process Clause’s protection of “liberty.”  We will later address
a few particular issues that arise from the Supreme Court’s methodology in
these cases.
C. When Officials Do Heinous Things
Up to this point, we have seen how the Supreme Court took more and
more steps toward abstraction by (1) interpreting the Due Process Clause to
require all legislation to be reasonable, and (2) defining “liberty” very
broadly.  In doing so, the Supreme Court forged the power to strike down
legislation because it unreasonably interfered with some right included in its
broad definition of “liberty.”
But what about cases in which it is not legislation that unreasonably
interferes with liberty?  What if the state’s agent takes a person’s property,
100 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (incorporating the freedom of assem-
bly); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (confirming incorporation of the free-
dom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (incorporating the freedom of
the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (assuming incorporation of the free-
dom of speech and of the press).
101 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  The Court later extended its reasoning from married couples
to nonmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
102 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
103 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
104 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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interferes with his or her liberty, or even kills that person—without legisla-
tion explicitly authorizing or prohibiting it?  The Supreme Court decided
that such executive barbarism, too, violates the guarantee of the Due Process
Clause.
Indeed, one might think that any executive conduct that violates state
law would also violate the Due Process Clause.  Under the commonsense,
textual interpretation, executive officials violate the due process guarantee
whenever they deprive a person of liberty or property without authorization
by existing law.  That would mean that government officials also violate the
guarantee when the deprivation violates existing state law.  Every violation of
state law should therefore also violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause, right?  After all, were not the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers
concerned with Southern states ignoring their own procedural laws?
The Court has not thought so.  Instead, only deprivations of liberty or
property that “shock the conscience” rise to the level of a due process viola-
tion.  In Rochin v. California,106  Los Angeles police broke into Mr. Rochin’s
room, where he was sitting on the side of the bed, half-dressed.107  The
officers saw a few capsules on the nightstand and asked, “whose stuff is this?,”
at which point Rochin lunged for the capsules and swallowed them.  A scuffle
ensued, during which officers “jumped on him” to try to force the capsules
out.  Finding brute force too blunt for the task, the officers took Rochin to a
hospital, where they ordered a doctor to “pump” Rochin’s stomach.  The
doctor forced a tube down Rochin’s throat and poured in emetic solution,
which promptly caused Rochin to vomit the capsules.  The capsules con-
tained an illegal substance—morphine.108  A hunch now vindicated, the state
used the capsules as evidence in Rochin’s trial for illegal possession of mor-
phine.  The Supreme Court thought the officers’ behavior offended “even
hardened sensibilities”—so close was it “to the rack and the screw.”109  And
so Rochin’s conviction had been “obtained by methods that offend the Due
Process Clause.”110  The officers’ conduct had, quite simply, “shock[ed] the
conscience.”111  In cases since then, the Court has applied Rochin’s reasoning
and asked whether executive conduct shocks the conscience.112
The contrast between the Rochin rule and the commonsense, textual
interpretation of the Due Process Clause is striking.  Like the commonsense
interpretation, Rochin’s approach forbids executive officials from depriving
individual liberty or property when existing law does not already authorize it.
But unlike the commonsense interpretation, Rochin relies on a far more crea-
tive interpretation of what it means to “deprive” a person of  “liberty or prop-
erty.”  The Rochin approach does not only place limitations on executive
106 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
107 Id. at 166.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 172.
110 Id. at 174.
111 Id. at 172.
112 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1988).
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officials’ power to imprison or take away a person’s land or chattel; it limits
executive officials’ power to burden a person’s liberty in myriad ways—from
physical injury to the rack and screw to (eventually) burdening a familial
relationship.113  Again, we see the Court’s definition of “liberty” is expansive.
But the Court’s expansive interpretation of liberty exponentially
increases the number of ways executive officials could transgress the Consti-
tution.  Practically every tort becomes a substantive due process violation.  If
the government official shoots a person, or interferes with a person’s job, or
crashes into someone else’s vehicle while driving, the official has likely bur-
dened the person’s “liberty” as the Court has defined it.  It should not be
surprising, then, that the Supreme Court placed a different kind of limitation
on what kind of executive-official deprivations of “liberty” can violate the
guarantee of the Due Process Clause: only deprivations that “shock the con-
science.”  In other words, only very, very . . . very bad deprivations.
The Supreme Court said this explicitly in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis.114  There, the Court explained merely negligent deprivations of prop-
erty or liberty are not violations of due process, because “the due process
guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability
whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.”115  Instead, a
government official’s conduct violates due process only when his or her con-
duct is conscience shocking.
In this sense, the Supreme Court’s shocks-the-conscience caselaw is a
derivation of the commonsense interpretation of the Due Process Clause
(that executive officials cannot take someone’s property or liberty in a way
unauthorized by existing law).  The difference is scope.  It is broader than
the commonsense interpretation because the Court has defined “liberty”
more broadly.  It is narrower because only very egregious deprivations of a
person’s liberty can violate the Due Process Clause.  But, the shocks-the-con-
science caselaw remains true to at least one of the earliest interpretations of
the phrase “due process of law”: preventing unauthorized deprivations by
executive officials.  Given the Amendment’s history—the Southern states’
frequent deprivation of individual rights by state-sanctioned mobs or by offi-
cials ignoring standing law—it is easy to see a historical connection too.
When commentators denigrate the shocks-the-conscience strand of due pro-
cess as ahistorical, they are right, but not completely right—at least not when
considering the abuses that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to cure.
D. Other Kinds of Due Process
We have now summarized two varieties of Due Process Clause jurispru-
dence: the kind that identifies fundamental rights that state legislation can-
not infringe without adequate justification, and the kind that identifies
113 See, e.g., Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1153–56 (10th Cir. 2018).
114 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
115 Id. at 848; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official.”).
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executive conduct (deprivations of liberty or property) that are beyond the
pale.  We have seen how these two strands grew out of prior understandings
of due process through increasingly abstract interpretation.
That is not to say, however, that the simpler interpretations of “due pro-
cess of law” all died away.  Some of them are still with us.
To begin, we still have due process caselaw that deals with procedural
rights.  We call it “procedural due process,” though it should really be termed
“procedural fairness due process.”  In this line of cases, the Supreme Court
no longer looks at whether a state’s procedural rule (established either by
statute or court practice) deprives persons of property without traditional
common-law procedural protections.  But the Court does look to whether the
state’s procedures are fair.  It has developed rules about when a state must
hold a hearing or provide notice about an impending deprivation.116
The same is true in the criminal context.  The Court interprets the Due
Process Clause to require that state criminal procedures be fair.117  For some
reason, though, we reserve the label “procedural due process” only for civil
cases, and refer to due process doctrine in the criminal context simply as
“due process.”  Note, too, that the Supreme Court will sometimes find new
procedural rights for criminal trials, by deeming a right in the Bill of Rights
to be so fundamental that it should be “incorporated.”118
There is one last version of due process to discuss: due process against
state court decisions.  Just as with executive conduct, due process does not
protect against violations of state law as such.  If the challenge to judicial
action has to do with the procedures used in court, then “procedural” due
process applies, and courts ask whether the procedures were fair under
Supreme Court caselaw.  For nonprocedural challenges, a state court deci-
sion will violate due process only if it is an “arbitrary or capricious” abuse of
power.119  Usually, that requires that the decision be close to ridiculous—
that it be unreasoning, on purpose.
All told, then, there are at least five different strands of due process juris-
prudence.  (1) There is “procedural due process,” in which courts identify
procedural rights and review state civil procedures for fairness.  (2) There is
due process in the criminal context: requiring that criminal procedures be
fair and finding new procedural rights in the criminal context, including
through incorporation of some of the criminal trial rights contained in the
Bill of Rights.  And then there are the three forms of “substantive due pro-
cess.”  (3a) The first polices state legislation that enacts unfair procedures or
burdens liberty.  We suggest the proper reasoning is that state legislation that
infringes liberty without a good reason must have come from a faulty and
arbitrary use of the legislative process.  (3b) The second form polices depriva-
116 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
117 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012) (analyzing whether
admission of evidence was “so extremely unfair [as to] violate[ ] fundamental conceptions
of justice” (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990))).
118 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
119 See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990).
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tions of liberty or property by executive officials, but only when those depri-
vations are very severe.  (3c) And the third prohibits courts from wielding
their powers unreasonably.
To put things a different way, a due process claim may be asserted
against either the legislature, executive, or judiciary.  The legislative process
does not constitute the “process that is due” when legislation has no rational
basis at all (or is too vague to be reasonable), when it infringes a fundamental
right without a compelling reason, or when it enacts unfair procedures
(either in the civil or criminal realm).  Executive officials fail to provide the
“process that is due” when they deprive persons of life, liberty, or property in
conscience-shocking ways.  And state courts fail to provide the “process that is
due” when they render arbitrary decisions affecting the life, liberty, or prop-
erty of the parties before them.
All of these interpretations of the Due Process Clause are manifestations
of a single, admittedly abstract reading of the Clause: the “protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government.”120  That interpretation is
not completely ahistorical.  It is true Magna Carta attempted to curb arbitrar-
iness in executive power.  It is also true the Founders, influenced by Enlight-
enment philosophers, sought to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power.121
At the same time, we cannot deny this interpretation is quite abstract, and
that one could not get to the Court’s big due process cases without creative
interpretations of “due process” and “liberty.”
120 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
121 See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words
from Magna Charta . . . after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition,
the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unre-
strained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *233 (“The enormous weight of prerogative, if left to itself (as
in arbitrary governments it is), spreads havoc and destruction among all the inferior move-
ments: but, when balanced and regulated (as with us) by its proper counterpoise, timely
and judiciously applied, its operations are then equable and certain, it invigorates the
whole machine, and enables every part to answer the end of its construction.”); THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
67 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1690) (“A man . . . cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the
life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for
the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to
the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no
more than this.”); 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 113 (Thomas Nugent
trans., London, W. Clarke & Son, 6th ed. 1899) (1748) (without separation of powers “the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul”); id. at 126
(“[F]ix[ed] laws” help ensure “that the public judgments should no longer be the effect of
capricious will, or arbitrary power.”).
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III. CONFUSION
The graph we have sketched  above is an attempt at a linear regression.
We have tried to map a line over the Supreme Court’s disparate cases, with
limited success.  But this is not how courts talk about due process.  Nor is it
how litigants talk about it.  Instead, several features of current due process
jurisprudence ensure near total confusion.
First, the Supreme Court often does not specify which kind of “due pro-
cess” it is applying—ignoring the fact there are several different strands of
due process caselaw with very different reasoning.  Second, the Supreme
Court has not clearly explained when each “substantive due process” strand
of cases applies.  Third, the Court is not clear about when rights are funda-
mental.  Fourth, courts have developed separate strands of caselaw apart
from the general substantive due process framework.  And last, the Supreme
Court has not provided a usable test for courts to identify a fundamental
right.  We will address each of these shortcomings in turn.
A. Which Due Process?
Let’s begin with the Court’s frequent failure to distinguish between dif-
ferent strands of due process caselaw, particularly in its seminal cases of the
1970s and ’80s.  For whatever reason, a large number of the Court’s due pro-
cess decisions have concerned inmate lawsuits.  We begin with a case that
caused a great deal of confusion: Parratt v. Taylor.122
In the late 1970s, Mr. Bert Taylor, an inmate at a Nebraska prison,
ordered twenty dollars’ worth of hobby materials by mail order.  The pack-
ages arrived while Taylor was in solitary confinement, so two employees who
worked at the prison’s hobby center signed for them.  But somewhere, some-
how, the packages disappeared.  After Taylor’s stint in solitary confinement
had ended, Taylor found he had neither hobby materials nor answers.  Disap-
pointed, Taylor sued the warden and the hobby manager.  His argument was
simple: they had deprived him of property without due process of law.123
That theory of relief proved too simple for the Supreme Court.  The
Court thought that Taylor “[u]nquestionably” had shown a deprivation of
property.124  But the Court struggled to make sense of what Taylor could
mean when he said his hobby materials were taken from him “without due
process of law.”125  In one sense, Taylor’s meaning was obvious: there had
been no process that informed him that his hobby materials would be taken,
nor an opportunity for him to defend his rightful possession of them.  But of
course, there couldn’t have been such a process; the prison employees simply
lost the package (so far as we know, accidentally).
Backed into a corner by the ruthless logic of Taylor’s claim, the Court
simply changed the claim.  Under the Court’s reinterpretation, Taylor was
122 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
123 Id. at 529–31.
124 Id. at 536–37.
125 Id. at 537.
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really challenging Nebraska tort law:  Taylor wanted a hearing before he was
deprived of his packages, not just a tort suit that he could bring after his
hobby materials had already been mislaid.126  The Court explained
Nebraska’s tort system offered a fair procedural mechanism for Taylor to
obtain compensation, and thus his claim failed.127  Moreover, the Court said,
the loss was “not a result of some established state procedure,” but of “a ran-
dom and unauthorized act by a state employee.”128  By this, the Court did
not mean that the prison employees had not acted under color of state law,
for the Court had stated the opposite conclusion just a few pages before.129
Instead, the Court meant just that Taylor’s now-procedural claim could not
be based on misconduct by prison employees.
But of course, a challenge to state procedures could not prevail by show-
ing that state employees had not followed those procedures.  That had not
been Taylor’s claim.  Taylor had simply challenged the hobby-center employ-
ees’ negligent loss of his property.  Had the Court distinguished Taylor’s due
process claim against the conduct of state employees from due process claims
about procedure, the answer would have been clear: Taylor had not alleged a
deprivation that shocked the conscience.  Case dismissed.
Yet, because the Court had no clear framework for categorizing due pro-
cess claims, the Court instead threw lower courts into confusion.130  Did all
due process claims fail when there were other available state remedies?  Were
all due process claims based on a state employee’s “random and unautho-
rized acts” meritless, even when the employee had acted under color of law?
Wasn’t §1983’s whole purpose to provide an additional route to relief over
and above that provided by states?  Had not Monroe v. Pape131 held that offi-
cial abuse of power violated the Constitution, even when state law did not
authorize the abuse?132
Other Justices noticed the Court’s sleight of hand.  The Court had spo-
ken of “due process” in general, but had engaged in purely procedural analy-
sis.  Justice Blackmun wrote separately to note that he did “not understand
the Court to intimate that the sole content of the Due Process Clause is pro-
cedural regularity.”133  Justice Powell, too, noticed that the Court “fail[ed]
altogether to discuss the possibility that the kind of state action alleged here
126 Id.
127 Id. at 541.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 This confusion was widely addressed in the academy. See generally, e.g., Karen M.
Blum, The Implications of Parratt v. Taylor for Section 1983 Litigation, 16 URB. LAW. 363, 369
(1984); Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1530 (1999);
Leon Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 545, 546 (1982); Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process
Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 833.
131 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
132 See id. at 172.
133 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 27 10-JUN-20 15:08
2020] a  workable  substantive  due  process 1987
constitutes a violation of the substantive guarantees of the Due Process
Clause.”134
The Court repeated that failure a few years later.  The year Parratt was
decided, Mr. Russell Thomas Palmer was serving time in a Virginia prison,
where two prison officers barged into his cell to search for contraband.135  As
they did so, the officers destroyed some of Palmer’s personal things.  Like
Taylor, Palmer sued the officers on the theory that they had deprived him of
property without due process of law.136  The Fourth Circuit thought the
Supreme Court’s holding in Parratt surely applied: “[O]nce it is assumed that
a postdeprivation remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent act caus-
ing injury,” that court reasoned, “then that principle applies as well to ran-
dom and unauthorized intentional acts.”137
The Court approved the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.  Again, the Court’s
decision did not distinguish between the different kinds of due process doc-
trines.  It first restated Parratt’s holding in general terms: “[T]hat the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a state
employee negligently deprives an individual of property, provided that the
state makes available a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.”138  And its new
holding was just as broadly phrased: “We hold also that, even if petitioner
intentionally destroyed respondent’s personal property during the chal-
lenged shakedown search, the destruction did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia has provided respondent
an adequate postdeprivation remedy.”139
That holding went even further towards eliminating a large swathe of
§ 1983 cases, as the puzzled lower courts could well see.140  And then, the
Court turned a corner.  The case was Zinermon v. Burch141—which also arose
from events that happened the same year the Court decided Parratt.142  Staff
at Florida State Hospital committed Mr. Darrell Burch as a “ ‘voluntary’
mental patient.”143  The problem was that Burch was incompetent to give his
consent.144  Burch later sued the hospital employees who admitted him
because they had not applied state-law procedures for involuntary commit-
ment.145  Both the district court and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit had
applied Parratt and Hudson, concluding the employees’ errors were random
and unauthorized acts, and that Florida’s tort system therefore provided
134 Id. at 553 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
135 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 519 (1984).
136 Id. at 520.
137 Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir. 1983).
138 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531.
139 Id. at 536.
140 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1149–51 (4th ed. 1996); Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1530.
141 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
142 Id. at 118.
143 See id. at 114–15.
144 See id. at 115.
145 See id.
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Burch all the process he was due.146  The Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc
then reversed the district court, holding Burch’s case was unlike Parratt
because the state could have designed procedures to prevent employees from
mistakenly committing people involuntarily.147
This time around, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of
other strands of due process jurisprudence.  The Court said there were three
strands of due process law: incorporation, substantive due process, and pro-
cedural due process.148  (As we have seen, that formulation is overly simplis-
tic—especially because incorporation may be considered part of substantive
due process.)  But the important thing here is that the Court separated pro-
cedural from substantive due process, and implied the Parratt rule did not
apply to lawsuits raising a substantive due process claim.149  The Court sug-
gested Burch could have brought a claim against the employees for unjustifi-
ably depriving him of liberty, but said Burch had raised only a procedural
claim.150  At that point, the Court turned to the procedural claim and con-
fused the Parratt rule further, but that is outside the scope of our point here.
We want the attentive reader to glean two things from the ebb and flow
of the Court’s Parratt doctrine.  The first is the Court’s imprecision and fick-
leness.  The Court will either speak overbroadly—leaving lower courts to
guess what limits, if any, apply to its pronouncements—or else it will lay out a
rule and then have a change of heart later.151  And all the while, of course,
the Court pretends nothing has changed.  Even now, after Zinermon, doubt
persists as to whether its rule applies to substantive due process cases—doubt
that again arose from the Supreme Court’s cryptic suggestions in later
cases.152  The second lesson is that confusion might well have been avoided if
the Court had a clear framework for treating claims involving misconduct by
government officials.  We suspect the Court’s rule in Parratt came about
because the Court instinctively thought claims like Mr. Taylor’s could not
possibly rise to the level of due process violations, but did not know how to go
about saying so.  Or perhaps some in the majority did not want to give fur-
ther support to substantive due process as a concept.  Either way, had the
Court simply applied its already-existing shocks-the-conscience test from
Rochin, these cases would have been far simpler.
146 Id. at 115–16; Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir. 1983).
147 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 115–16.
148 See id. at 125–27.
149 See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1531–32.
150 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125–27.
151 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Essay, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 576, 578–79 (1993);
Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process,
and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 840 (2003).
152 See Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
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B. Which Substantive Due Process?
Just as the Court sometimes blurs the line between different strands of
due process, the Court has inconsistently applied its different versions of
“substantive” due process.  The Justices often speak of “substantive due pro-
cess” as containing two components: protection against “conduct that ‘shocks
the conscience,’” and protection against interference “with rights ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.’”153  But the Court has flip-flopped on when
one of those two components apply; that is, when courts should apply the
shocks-the-conscience test and when they should balance the government’s
interests against its interference with a fundamental right.  To begin, the
Court frequently does not say which of those components it is applying.  We
will provide examples of this later.  More important here is the confusion
that the Court created in a series of opinions in the late 1990s and 2000s.
One of the most important in that series was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg.154  In it, Rehnquist attempted a sweeping
reconceptualization of the Court’s substantive due process caselaw.  As
already explained, beginning with Rochin, the Supreme Court had often
asked whether executive conduct violated substantive due process by “shock-
ing the conscience.”155  But in Glucksberg, the Court appeared to roll that
approach into the fundamental-rights approach.  Citing most of the Court’s
big substantive due process cases, the Court said the “established method of
substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features.”156  “First,” the
Court said, “we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects . . . fundamental rights and liberties.”157  “Second, we have required
in substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest.”158  The Court seemed to imply all substantive due
process cases had to do with protection of fundamental rights.  And the
Court even cited Rochin as an example of a case dealing with such a right:
namely, the right to bodily integrity.159
That unified theory might have its own problems, as we will later dis-
cuss.160  In any case, the unified theory did not last long.  In May 1990, two
153 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); accord Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
435–36 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 125–26 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
154 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
155 See, e.g., Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1906 (2018); Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
156 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); see also Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (in identifying due process
rights “[w]e refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified”).
159 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
160 See infra Section IV.B.
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police officers saw a motorcycle traveling at high speed.161  The driver was
eighteen-year-old Brian Willard, and behind him rode passenger Philip
Lewis, aged sixteen.  The officers turned on their lights and yelled at the boys
to stop, but Willard maneuvered around the patrol car and sped away.  The
officers took to the chase at high speed, and Willard weaved in and out of
traffic, causing cars to swerve off the road.  Then, the motorcycle tipped over.
The officer driving close behind slammed on the brakes, but could not avoid
skidding right into Lewis—killing him.  Lewis’s parents sued.  They said the
officers had been so reckless in their chase that they had deprived Lewis of
life without due process of law.162
Lewis’s case put the Glucksberg formulation in the dock.  If Glucksberg was
the “established” test for substantive due process cases, how would it apply
here?  Did Lewis have a right to be free from the reckless police pursuit that
killed him?  If so, would not Lewis win under any level of scrutiny?  For how
could an officers’ reckless pursuit be “narrowly tailored” to achieving a “com-
pelling interest”?  Or how could a reckless pursuit even have a rational basis?
Now the Court returned to its old friend, abstraction.  “Since the time of
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the
concept to be protection against arbitrary action,” the Court wrote.163  And
then the Court explicitly said that “criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmen-
tal officer that is at issue.”164  But, perhaps embarrassed by the about-face,
the Court suggested the fundamental-rights test still applied to executive
action, except that it was the second step in the analysis.  The first step was to
ask whether the government official’s conduct shocked the conscience.  The
Court explained that “a case challenging executive action on substantive due
process grounds, like this one, presents an issue antecedent to any question
about the need for historical examples of enforcing a liberty interest of the
sort claimed.”165  “Thus, in a due process challenge to executive action, the
threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience,” the majority said.166  It continued:
Only if the necessary condition of egregious behavior were satisfied would
there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process right to be free
of such executive action, and only then might there be a debate about the
sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement of the right claimed, or its
recognition in other ways.167
161 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1998).
162 Id. at 837.
163 Id. at 845.
164 Id. at 846.
165 Id. at 847 n.8.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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Justice Scalia didn’t withhold his scorn in disagreeing with the majority’s
approach.  He argued the majority had resurrected the “atavistic” shocks-the-
conscience test Glucksberg put down a few years earlier.168
So it seemed the shocks-the-conscience test was back, though for how
long was anyone’s guess.  But although the shocks-the-conscience test had
been rehabilitated as a viable method for analyzing substantive due process
claims, when that test applied was again unclear.
Chavez v. Martinez169 raised that question and offered no clear answer.
Several months before the Court handed down its decision in Lewis, police
officers in Oxnard, California, were staking out a vacant lot, where they sus-
pected a drug deal would take place.  While the officers questioned someone
in the vacant lot, they heard the rustle of a bicycle coming their way.  They
told the rider—Oliviero Martinez—to dismount and place his hands behind
his head.  One of the officers frisked Martinez.  When the officer found a
knife, Martinez skirmished to get free.  At some point, one of the officers
yelled Martinez had taken his gun, and in an instant, the other officer shot
Martinez several times, leaving him permanently blinded and paralyzed.  In
the emergency room, where Martinez struggled for life, the officers contin-
ued interrogating him.  No charges were ever brought against Martinez, but
he later sued the officers, arguing, among other things, that the officers’
coercive interrogation while he was suffering from his wounds violated sub-
stantive due process.170
The Court split, with no full opinion receiving five votes.171  Indeed, the
only thing five Justices could agree on was that “[w]hether Martinez may pur-
sue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation is . . . an issue
that should be addressed on remand, along with the scope and merits of any
such action that may be found open to him.”172  Martinez had challenged
the conduct of government officials.  Thus, under the framework announced
in Lewis, one would have thought the Court would first ask whether the
officers’ interrogation shocked the conscience, and if the answer was no, that
the case would be over.
Upon reaching the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Justice Thomas
began—writing for himself and two others—first by asking whether the inter-
rogation shocked the conscience, and then concluding the “questioning did
168 Id. at 861–62 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
169 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
170 Id. at 763–65 (plurality opinion).
171 Justice Thomas wrote a plurality opinion joined in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and in part by Justices O’Connor and Scalia, which held the questioning and failure to
recite Miranda warnings did not violate Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  Justice Thomas went on to opine, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, that Martinez’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment had
not been violated. Justice Souter, in an opinion joined in full by Justice Breyer and in part
by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, held the viability of Martinez’s substantive due
process claim should be addressed on remand.  Four other opinions were filed, concurring
and dissenting in part.
172 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779–80 (plurality opinion).
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not violate Martinez’s due process rights.”173  But immediately following that
conclusion, Justice Thomas went on to discuss the fundamental-rights test, as
if it were an alternative way in which interrogation could violate due process:
“[T]he Due Process Clause also protects certain ‘fundamental liberty inter-
est[s]’ from deprivation by the government, regardless of the procedures
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.”174  Under this approach, too, Justice Thomas found Marti-
nez’s claim wanting.  He explained: “[W]e can find no basis in our prior
jurisprudence . . . or in our Nation’s history and traditions to suppose that
freedom from unwanted police questioning is a right so fundamental that it
cannot be abridged absent a ‘compelling state interest.’”175  So it seemed
Justice Thomas applied both tests, rather than stopping when Martinez failed
to show that the interrogation shocked the conscience.
Other Justices implied the same.  Justice Stevens referred to the shocks-
the-conscience and fundamental-rights formulas as two different stan-
dards.176  And three Justices who wrote concurring and dissenting opinions
briefly suggested the fundamental-rights test applied to Martinez’s case.
They explained that it was “a simple enough matter to say that use of torture
or its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an individual’s
fundamental right to liberty of the person.”177
Once again, lower courts strove to make sense of the Court’s impreci-
sion.178  The Tenth Circuit, for example, at first decided that Chavez’s clear
import was that the shocks-the-conscience and fundamental-rights tests were
alternative tests that could be applied in any given case.179  (In other words, a
particular government action could violate due process under either test.)
But in a later case, the Tenth Circuit recoiled at the thought of applying the
shocks-the-conscience test to legislation and construed its prior reading of
173 Id. at 774.
174 Id. at 775 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Chavez, 521
U.S. at 721).
175 Id. at 776.
176 See id. at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
177 Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy was
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in this part of his opinion.
178 See, e.g., Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 946 (6th Cir. 2019) (McKeague, J., concur-
ring and dissenting in part) (“We measure whether the deprivation of a right to bodily
integrity—or any other substantive-due-process right—actually occurred by determining
whether a defendant’s alleged conduct was so heinous and arbitrary that it can fairly be
said to ‘shock the conscience.’  At times we have treated these two elements (deprivation of
a constitutional right and conscience-shocking behavior) as separate methods of stating a
substantive-due-process claim.  At other times we have concluded they are both required.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir.
1996)).
179 See Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ‘shocks
the conscience’ and ‘fundamental liberty’ tests are but two separate approaches to analyz-
ing governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment.  They are not mutually exclu-
sive, however.  Courts should not unilaterally choose to consider only one or the other of
the two strands.  Both approaches may well be applied in any given case.”).
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Chavez as dicta on that point.180  And then, in still another case, the Tenth
Circuit went back to the Lewis approach.181  Then-Judge Gorsuch, writing for
a unanimous panel, explained that “some question lingers about all this,” but
that “Chavez did not expressly overrule Lewis’s holding that the  ‘arbitrary or
conscience shocking’ test is the appropriate one for executive action so we
feel obliged to apply it.”182
The Tenth Circuit’s struggle has been replicated many places besides.
Several circuits disagree on the correct interpretation of Lewis, Chavez, and
Glucksberg.183  Uncertainty only adds to the difficulty of properly resolving
these cases.
C. What Kind of Right?
1. Fundamental or Not?
Still another problem is the Court’s failure to specify whether a right is
fundamental.  The Court’s pretrial detention cases are an example.  In those
cases, the Court often fails to mention crucial details that lower courts need
in order to make sense of the holding:  for example, whether the Court is
applying the shocks-the-conscience standard or the fundamental-rights stan-
dard; or, when the Court speaks about a right, whether that right is funda-
mental or not.  Those questions matter, for they determine which level of
scrutiny lower courts should use when they confront similar cases.
In the first such case, Bell v. Wolfish,184 a group of people awaiting trial
sued a federal prison in New York on the ground that the prison’s conditions
violated due process.185  The Second Circuit held that, because those pretrial
detainees were presumed innocent until proven guilty, the government
would have to show a compelling governmental interest to justify any part of
prison conditions to which the detainees objected (like double bunking).186
The Supreme Court rejected that ruling.  First off, the Court repudiated
the idea that the detainees’ desire to be free from discomfort during impris-
180 See Dias v. City & County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009).
181 See Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1078–79 (10th Cir. 2015).
182 Id. at 1079 n.1.
183 Compare Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2018)
(explaining how the court applies the fundamental-rights approach to legislation and the
shocks-the-conscience test to executive action), and Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695
F.3d 531, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining the two strands of substantive due process and
noting that for executive action to violate substantive due process, it must shock the con-
science), with Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1181–82 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
a plaintiff challenging executive action must satisfy both the rights test and the shocks-the-
conscience test to prevail), Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738 (4th Cir. 1999) (same),
and Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (suggesting both tests could
apply as alternatives in any given case).
184 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
185 See id. at 523.
186 See id. at 531–32.
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onment amounted to a “fundamental” right.187  Instead, the Court thought
the relevant right was the “right to be free from punishment.”188  A detainee
could show that the prison conditions amounted to unconstitutional punish-
ment before trial if they could show that the prison officials intended the
conditions as punishment, or if there was no rational basis for the condi-
tions.189  The Court did not say whether that right was fundamental,
although it seemed to imply as much.  Yet the legal standard was not so tough
for the government to meet.  For even if the right to be free from punish-
ment before trial is fundamental, the Court figured out whether the condi-
tions were punitive by looking for a rational basis.
The Bell decision was not so bad, as Supreme Court due process deci-
sions go.  The Court had clearly articulated the test that would govern prison
conditions for pretrial detainees.  True, the Court failed to distinguish
between the shocks-the-conscience and fundamental-rights tests.  But overall,
the opinion seemed clear.
Things became less clear when the Court applied Bell in Schall v. Mar-
tin,190 in which juveniles challenged a New York statute that provided for
their detention before trial.191  Unlike in Bell, the juveniles here challenged
not the conditions of confinement, but the confinement itself.  The Supreme
Court phrased the question on appeal imprecisely: “The question before us,”
it said, “is whether preventive detention of juveniles . . . is compatible with
the ‘fundamental fairness’ required by due process.”192  Then, the Court
went on to perform a freewheeling analysis that it did not care to explain.
First, the Court balanced the deprivation of the juveniles’ “undoubtedly
substantial” right to freedom with the legitimate state interest in preventing
crime and protecting juveniles from their own misdeeds.193  It concluded,
again vaguely, that the state’s decision was “compatible” with fundamental
fairness.194  The Court made no mention as to what standard of scrutiny it
was applying, nor whether it considered the juveniles’ right to be free from
detention to be fundamental (though we can guess the Court did not think
so, because it noted that juveniles are in the custody of adults most of the
time).195  Next the Court cited the Bell rule that pretrial detention cannot be
meant as punishment.196  But the Court was not clear whether the Bell rule
was a separate rule, or just part of its balancing test.  As a preface to its appli-
cation of the Bell rule, the Court said that it was “still necessary to determine
whether the terms and conditions of confinement under” the statute “are in
187 See id. at 534.
188 Id. at 533–35.
189 Id. at 537–38.
190 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
191 See id. at 255–56.
192 Id. at 263.
193 Id. at 265.
194 Id. at 268.
195 Id. at 265.
196 Id. at 269.
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fact compatible with” the government’s regulatory purpose.197  In the end,
the Court found New York’s detention scheme had a rational basis unrelated
to punishment and thus upheld the law.198  The Court’s words may be read
two ways.  The Court may have been applying two separate tests: the first
balancing the government’s interest against the defendant’s liberty interest;
the second asking whether the government meant to punish.  The alternative
is that the Court was applying just one test—the Bell test.  Under this reading,
the first part of the Court’s opinion was simply asking what nonpunitive inter-
ests the government could possibly have, while the second part asked
whether the statute’s particulars were “in fact compatible” with those
nonpunitive objectives.
The Court left more questions open too.  Was the right to be free from
pretrial detention a fundamental right that required the government to meet
strict scrutiny?  Or was it a lesser right?  Or did it depend on whether the
detainees were minors or adults?  We might make good guesses on these
questions, but nothing more.
The same lack of clarity graced the pages of the Court’s decision in
United States v. Salerno.199  On March 21, 1986, ambitious prosecutors threw
the book at Anthony Salerno, head of the Genovese crime family “La Cosa
Nostra,” and Vincent Cafaro, his right-hand man.200  Together, they faced a
twenty-nine-count indictment for a litter of crimes including racketeering,
gambling operations, and conspiracy to murder.201  The government moved
to detain the duo before trial, without bail, under the newly minted Bail
Reform Act of 1984.202  That legislation allowed the government to detain
defendants without bail if it provided clear and convincing evidence that
those defendants were too dangerous to release.  Salerno and Cafaro, the
government claimed, could not safely go free on bail.  After the district court
agreed, Salerno and Cafaro argued that the Bail Reform Act violated due
process.203  The government could hardly have asked for better facts in a
challenge to the Bail Reform Act, yet the Second Circuit had thought the Bail
Reform Act went too far.  In the Second Circuit’s view, detention based on
“dangerousness,” violated  the principle that persons should not be deprived
of liberty before being judged guilty, except for the purpose of forcing them
to stand trial.204
Unlike the cases discussed above, the Court did mention the two differ-
ent strands of substantive due process at the beginning of its analysis.  “So-
called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the
197 Id.
198 Id. at 273–74.
199 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
200 See id. at 743.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 742–46.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 744–45.
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concept of ordered liberty,’” the Court explained.205  But the Court did not
say how those strands applied to the case.  Instead the Court applied the Bell
test again, asking whether the Bail Reform Act was meant to punish defend-
ants before trial.  It concluded that the Act was just regulatory, not puni-
tive.206  Moreover, the Court explained, the detention was not “excessive in
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.”207  That lan-
guage did not seem like anything close to strict scrutiny, and what followed
made it seem like it was still part of the Bell test.  The Court balanced the
regulatory interest against the scope of the Act’s restrictions on bail and con-
cluded the Act did not provide for “punishment before trial in violation of
the Due Process Clause.”208
Adding to the impression that the Bell test was all that mattered, the
Court then explained that the Second Circuit had “nevertheless concluded”
that the Bail Reform Act was unconstitutional.209  The Second Circuit was
wrong, however, because the “regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”210  At
this point, the Court used language that implied that it was applying strict
scrutiny.  The Court said that the “government’s interest in preventing crime
by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.”211  And it explained that “[o]n
the other side of the scale . . . [wa]s the individual’s strong interest in lib-
erty”—an interest that was of a “fundamental nature.”212  Perhaps the Court
really was recognizing a fundamental right after all.
When all was said and done, the Bail Reform Act’s legality was clear but
the Court’s methodology was not.  Unsurprisingly, lower courts have inter-
preted the Court’s decision differently.  For example, the Tenth Circuit has
been unsure about whether Salerno and Schall applied something beyond the
Bell test,213 whereas the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Salerno to require strict
scrutiny analysis of all bail regulation.214  As the reader has likely already
noticed, such confusion is par for the course in substantive due process.
205 Id. at 746 (first quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); and then
quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
206 Id. at 748.
207 Id. at 747.
208 Id. at 748.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
213 See Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 732 F. App’x 624, 631 (10th Cir. 2018) (Salerno
did not apply strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 (2019); United States v. Deters, 143
F.3d 577, 583 (10th Cir. 1998) (Salerno did not “articulate[ ] a clear test for determining
when pretrial confinement of an accused is permissible under the Due Process Clause”).
214 Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 779–81 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Salerno
applied strict scrutiny apart from the Bell test).
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2. Solitary Silos
Things get even more complicated when one considers the specific tests
that courts apply to particular contexts.  The Bell test we just explained is one
example: a specific test that applies only to cases involving detention before
trial.  This development is natural; one should hope that jurisprudence
would develop a rule more specific than “don’t shock my conscience.”  What
becomes problematic is silence about how a more specific test relates to the
broader due process framework.  We have already noted this problem in
cases about pretrial detention; the Court has not made it clear how the Bell
test relates to the broader substantive due process frameworks.
We can see another example in familial-association claims.  In those
cases, plaintiffs allege that a government official has purposely tried to inter-
fere with their family relationship, usually involving a child.  Circuits vary a
bit in their approaches to such claims, but most require that the plaintiff
show the official intended to interfere in the familial relationship and did not
have a legitimate governmental reason to do so.215
But how does that specific test relate to other due process jurispru-
dence?  Does it displace the more generic shocks-the-conscience and funda-
mental-rights tests?  Can plaintiffs choose which theory to pursue?  Or must
plaintiffs meet both this specific test and one of the normal ones too?  Cir-
cuits have not agreed on an answer.  Some have suggested the more specific
test is simply an iteration of the shocks-the-conscience test, or that the plain-
tiff must meet the specific test and show that the official’s conduct shocks the
conscience.216  Others have suggested that the shocks-the-conscience stan-
dard applies only when there is no more specific test, or that it is an alterna-
tive theory on which a plaintiff can prevail.217  Again, there is a dire need for
order in due process jurisprudence.
215 See, e.g., Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1153–54 (10th Cir. 2018); Porter v.
Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2008); Trujillo v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d
1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985).
216 See Halley, 902 F.3d at 1155 (specific test is an iteration of the shocks-the-conscience
test); Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Lewis clarified that the shocks-the-
conscience test, first articulated in Rochin v. California, governs all substantive due process
claims based on executive, as opposed to legislative, action”—including familial-association
claims (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)); Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129,
143 (2d Cir. 2003) (to prevail on a familial-association claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate
that her separation from [her child] was so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due
Process Clause would not countenance it”); see also United States v. Hollingsworth, 495
F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 2007) (implying a claim for violation of familial association must
show the government conduct shocks the conscience).
217 See Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs., 725 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining
the shocks-the-conscience standard only applies when a claim does not pertain to a specific
substantive due process right, and concluding the shocks-the-conscience standard there-
fore does not apply to familial-association claims); Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d
1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (for a familial association claim “[t]o amount to a violation of
substantive due process . . . the harmful conduct must ‘shock[ ] the conscience’ or ‘offend
the community’s sense of fair play and decency’” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
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3. Distinguishing Genuine Rights
The last problem relates to finding new rights.  When litigants come to
the courts with a shiny new object in their hands, and claim they found it
among the other rights the Court has dug up, how do courts tell if the pur-
ported right is genuine?  How do courts know whether the litigants indeed
assert a right implicit in ordered liberty, or whether they bear a right they
should take to their legislatures instead?  That subject is perhaps the most
contentious of all, so it is not surprising the Supreme Court routinely contra-
dicts itself.  Whether we think the Court correct or not in striking down the
state laws in each of its blockbuster cases, one thing is certain: the Court has
left lower courts little to no guidance in finding “fundamental rights” for
themselves.
Let us ask the question directly, then.  How do courts of appeals go
about identifying new rights?  The first approach was that of Lochner, later
resurrected in Griswold and Roe—namely, to infer rights from the (abstractly
defined) purposes of the Bill of Rights, or from moral intuition.218  But that
approach is difficult to implement in a consistent fashion.  It is not surprising
the Court later constrained this freewheeling divination in Washington v.
Glucksberg, which put forward a test grounded in history.219  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has so far evaded even this attempt at a limiting principle,
once again through abstraction.220
IV. SOLUTIONS
We have now described five different problems with substantive due pro-
cess caselaw: (1) the Court’s frequent failure to distinguish between the vari-
ous kinds of due process jurisprudence; (2) confusion about when to apply
the various strands of due process cases; (3) the Court’s failure to specify
165, 172–73 (1952)))); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 n.23 (9th Cir.
2010) (concluding the shocks-the-conscience standard does not apply to familial-associa-
tion claims); Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 691 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting a plaintiff
could prevail on a familial-association claim if the conduct shocked the conscience); Mor-
ris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 667–68 (5th Cir. 1999) (apparently treating the shocks-the-
conscience standard as one of multiple ways in which a plaintiff could assert a familial
association claim).
Many other circuits’ cases simply do not mention the issue. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer
County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85
F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996).
218 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[T]he [Due Process] Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory and tradition.’” (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
220 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (stating that “rights
come not from ancient sources alone” but also from a “better informed understanding of
how constitutional imperatives define a liberty”).
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when a right is fundamental and therefore triggers strict scrutiny; (4) uncer-
tainty about how the more specific strands of due process caselaw (like cases
in the prison context) relate to the more general due process standards; and
(5) the lack of a workable standard for recognizing unenumerated rights.
These problems are wide ranging but connected.  We would like to
briefly describe two possible solutions.  The first helps resolve four of the five
problems.  The Supreme Court should categorize its due process caselaw and
clearly identify the standards it is applying in each case.  The second possible
solution would help with the last problem: the lack of any coherent standard
for recognizing unenumerated rights.  Absent a major doctrinal course cor-
rection, the Court could repackage and relaunch the Glucksberg test.
A. Creating a Due Process Flowchart
The first two problems relate to the Court’s lack of specificity as to what
strand of due process jurisprudence it is applying.  In one sense, the answer
could be as simple as saying “be more specific.”  But we do not think that
would do.  The problem is not just the caselaw’s disorganization, but the lack
of a coherent framework for categorizing different kinds of due process
cases.  That deficiency is no one’s fault.  Almost by necessity, the Court’s due
process law has developed in a common-law-like discursion.  And so far, the
Court has not synthesized the century or so of caselaw that has come
before.221  But failure to synthesize has serious consequences.  A vicious cycle
ensues: the Court hears a case in a new context (for example, loss of hobby
kits in prison), has no framework to address it, engages in freewheeling bal-
ancing, and thus does not establish a clear rule to resolve like cases going
forward.  Repeat this cycle enough times and one is sure to have a judiciary
without rules of law to apply.  It is a common-law approach without the linear
reasoning.
In our brief recounting of the history of due process caselaw, we have
tried to demonstrate that due process cases can be usefully categorized into
claims against the legislature, claims against executive officials, and claims
against judicial action.  To repeat our earlier synthesis, different standards do
(or should) govern each of those categories.  The legislative process does not
constitute the “process that is due” when legislation has no rational basis at
all, when it is too vague to be reasonable, when it infringes a fundamental
right without a compelling reason and narrowly tailored means, or when it
enacts egregiously unfair procedures (either in the civil or criminal realm).
Executive officials, by contrast, fail to provide the “process that is due” when
they deprive persons of life, liberty, or property in conscience-shocking ways.
Finally, state courts fail to provide the “process that is due” when they set
unfair procedures, or when they render arbitrary decisions impairing the life,
liberty, or property of the parties before them.
221 In Dworkinian terms, each decision’s fit within a larger interpretive framework
remains unexplained. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116, 340–41
(1978).
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This framework makes sense.  As already alluded to, the fundamental-
rights test is ill suited to evaluating particular conduct.  That test is quintes-
sentially one for legislation, not executive acts.  It asks whether a right is fun-
damental, and if so, whether the government’s interference is narrowly
tailored to effect a compelling interest.  When an official exercising his
authority separates a child from his parents, or intentionally rams into
another vehicle at high speed, or destroys a person’s reputation, does it make
sense to ask whether the officer’s actions were narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest?  Unless we are prepared to substantially
lower the bar for what counts as a compelling interest, we should not try to
superimpose this essentially legislative test on individual conduct.  Officers’
actions on a given day are subject to all sorts of outside factors—for example,
things they don’t know, things they reasonably think they know but are mis-
taken about, and the tension of emergency situations.  These factors can
excuse or mitigate the ill consequences of executive conduct.  Yet those
intangible factors are square pegs to the round holes of “compelling interest”
and “narrow tailoring.”
What is more, applying the fundamental-rights test to executive conduct
is likely to constitutionalize too many torts.  The Court has often warned of
the danger of turning due process into a “font of tort law.”222  It is true that,
after the Court’s decision in Daniels v. Williams,223 negligent acts never count
as “deprivations” of life, liberty, or property.224  But applying the fundamen-
tal-rights test to the conduct of executive officials would still turn all kinds of
intentional torts into events of constitutional significance.
The more reasonable approach, by far, is to hold that executive conduct
violates due process only when the deprivation is egregious.  That approach
comes from a commonsense recognition that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed the Amendment’s text would curb abuse of official
power in the South.  As we’ve tried to show, this standard is the shocks-the-
conscience test.  Naturally, the inquiry here is fact intensive but accommodat-
ing of all those intangible considerations that lower the reading on the out-
rage barometer.
The reverse is also true: the shocks-the-conscience test is not useful for
reviewing legislation.  Words on paper generally have a tougher time shock-
ing people than actions.  The standard provides few guardrails to prevent
judges from falling off either of two ledges: the oversensitivity that leads to
enforcing policy preferences as law, and the stoicism that leads to rubber-
stamping every Act.  The fundamental-rights test provides a comparatively
clearer path: examining the burdens legislation places on a right and the
potential reasons for burdening that right.  No doubt the fundamental-rights
test still allows for much subjectivity, but less so.  And the fundamental-rights
222 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847–48 & n.8 (1998); accord Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
223 474 U.S. 327.
224 Id. at 330–32.
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test is better grounded in the theory of evaluating legislation under the Due
Process Clause: looking for irrationality in the legislative process.225
Similarly, the “arbitrariness” standard that the Supreme Court has
espoused for evaluating judicial decisions makes sense.  The bar is high
enough to prevent federal courts from reviewing all state-law mistakes.  And
this standard appropriately guides the inquiry: we are only reviewing for
unreasoning action, the kind of action that can best be explained as an abuse
of power by a state court.  Applying the fundamental-rights test in the context
of judicial action would often turn into a duplicative analysis of the underly-
ing state law.  And again, the shocks-the-conscience test would not fit well.  A
judicial decision might be truly arbitrary and petty and yet not shock the
conscience because the pettiness is small.  Likewise, a state judge might be
doing what he or she is supposed to, and the result might still be reviling
because the underlying law’s application seems unjust.
We recognize that some wish to do away with the shocks-the-conscience
test altogether.  Judicial conservatives get particularly anxious around the
shocks-the-conscience test.  It carries a whiff of subjectivity.  The very words
make plain that judges must use their personal consciences to decide what is
or is not lawful.  And the test’s heritage is just as disconcerting for them—
bearing the mark of some of the Supreme Court’s most activist days and its
one-time leading liberal.  As Justice Scalia gibed in remonstrance to the Lewis
majority, the “atavistic” test is “the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the
Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity.”226
Those criticisms surely have truth to them and many judges could live
with a doctrinal reevaluation by the Supreme Court.  But absent that, the test
survived for nearly a century and seems to remain alive and kicking.  The
question is whether that test should be invoked ad hoc, or pursuant to a
defined framework.  And, if the test applies exclusively to executive conduct,
it will not have the effect that many conservatives fear: judicial interference
with democratic decisions.  Indeed, the test might even have a salutary effect:
its rhetoric limits federal-court oversight of executive officials, for judges will
have to say that an officials’ action shocked the conscience with a straight
face.
225 Courts ought not lightly declare legislation irrational, particularly when it reflects
longstanding or deeply-rooted social rules and traditions. Cf. Edmund Burke, Reflections on
the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 443 (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1999) (1790) (“The science of government being, therefore, so practical in itself, and
intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more
experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he
may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an
edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of soci-
ety, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved utility
before his eyes.”).  In the due process context, courts are more likely to err in declaring
legislation irrational than in declaring it rational, because statutory enactment requires the
assent of numerous legislators—each of whom is endowed with the same natural reason as
his or her counterpart in the judiciary.
226 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
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There is also no reason why the shocks-the-conscience test cannot be
given more specific legal meaning.  In a way, the phrase is already a legal
term of art—a shorthand for the idea that the Due Process Clause is con-
cerned with only those cases in which the gravity of the harm and the impro-
priety of the conduct are especially appalling.  And courts can, in common-
law fashion, specify particular factors that shock the conscience in various
contexts.  Courts may, for example, refine the kinds of factors that shock the
conscience in cases involving use of force by prison guards.  It will be no
different than fashioning legal tests for what counts as “cruel and unusual
punishment” or “excessive force.”
Put differently, the Supreme Court must take things one step at a time.
It should first clarify and consistently apply the correct substantive due pro-
cess framework to each scenario.  Once the appropriate framework is in
place, inferior courts can develop a body of caselaw from fact-intensive analy-
sis.  That caselaw can provide data points about what “shocks the conscience,”
just as it does in other areas of constitutional adjudication.
That brings us to our next point—how to deal with the little silos of
orphaned due process caselaw.  Those specific areas of law should be
adopted under one of the broader due process frameworks.  For example,
the familial-association cases should be thought of as a child of the shocks-
the-conscience framework.  We can say that government officials shock the
conscience when they purposefully and maliciously interfere with a family
relationship.  Defining the relationship between the specific standard and
the general standard would prevent litigants from arguing that they can win
under either standard.  True, the same goal can be accomplished by saying
the more specific test always applies.  But the problem is that in new areas,
the question will be whether a specific test should be crafted or whether the
general shocks-the-conscience test should be used.  To avoid that pitfall,
courts should simply state that more specific tests are applications of the
shocks-the-conscience tests to particular contexts.
The same logic holds for tests that apply to legislation in specific con-
texts.  Those more specific tests should be tied to the general due process
framework for legislation.  For instance, the Bell test, which asks whether pre-
trial detention policies are punitive, should be expressly linked to the funda-
mental-rights test when it is applied to legislation.  Persons detained before
trial have a right not to be subjected to conditions or procedures that have
no rational basis other than punishment.
We have two more points to make before moving on to our second pro-
posed solution.  First, the framework proposed here depends on a distinction
between legislative acts and executive acts.  In most cases, that distinction will
be clear.  But sometimes the line will be hazy.227  What about a police depart-
ment’s written policy?  What about an informal policy that is generally appli-
cable?  Should courts treat those policies as legislation (and evaluate them
for interference with a right), or should they treat them as executive action
227 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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(and evaluate them under the shocks-the-conscience standard)?  We recog-
nize that line drawing on this inherently quixotic distinction is not ideal.  Yet
we already have legal standards for deciphering which government actions
count as legislative actions, particularly in the realm of procedural due pro-
cess.228  Those can be transplanted here.  We would suggest, however, that
the question should turn mostly on whether the challenged action is conduct
by government officials, or instead a policy that is applicable to more per-
sons.229  The number of affected persons is usually part of figuring out when
actions are legislative or not, and here, the shocks-the-conscience test is best
suited only to the conduct that directly affected the litigants.  In some cases,
surely, a plaintiff will challenge both the official’s conduct and the policy that
authorized that action.  In such cases, analysis of the policy, as the more spe-
cific, should control.  If the policy is constitutional, then acting in accordance
with it cannot “shock the conscience.”
That brings us to a second point.  Once courts give content to the
shocks-the-conscience test in specific contexts, the shocks-the-conscience test
and fundamental-rights test will sometimes look similar.  Take familial-associ-
ation claims as an example.  Courts generally hold that an executive violates
due process when he intentionally burdens a family relationship without
good reason, and we think that’s because courts have effectively decided that
such conduct shocks the conscience.  But suppose parents challenge a statute
that allowed the state to separate them from their children.  The fundamen-
tal-rights test will lead a court to ask whether the right to undisturbed family
relationship with one’s children is a fundamental right.  And in some way—
whether via strict scrutiny or via rational basis—the Court will evaluate the
state’s justifications for enacting a statute that interferes with that right.  That
analysis will look a lot like the analysis applied to a case against the govern-
ment official who interferes with a family relationship.
That similarity comes from the definition of the “liberty” right at issue.
When cases deal with abstract rights to liberty—such as the right to undis-
turbed family relationships or a right to contraception—the shocks-the-con-
science and fundamental-rights tests will look similar.  That is because an
analysis of what should be deemed conscience-shocking involves an assess-
ment of the impropriety of the government’s action, which, in turn, will
require analyzing the possible reasons for the government’s action.  But the
distinction is worth making for the reasons we have discussed.  The shocks-
the-conscience and fundamental-rights tests will often look different when
228 See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915);
see also Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 2016).
229 The Tenth Circuit confronted this problem in Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019 (10th
Cir. 2019).  Formally, Abdi’s alleged harm stemmed from executive agency action—inclu-
sion on the FBI’s Selectee List and No-Fly List—not an act of Congress.  But Abdi did not
allege “tortious conduct of an individual agency officer,” such as the TSA agents who
screened him. Id. at 1027.  Rather, he asserted a fundamental right to movement. Id. at
1024.  The court analyzed the case under the fundamental-rights framework, recognizing
that Abdi challenged an executive policy akin to a legislative act. See id. at 1027–28.
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the deprivation is more prosaic: say, a destruction of chattels, bodily injury,
or death.
In sum, substantive due process jurisprudence will be well served by cate-
gorizing cases as claims against the legislature, claims against government
officials, or claims against judicial action.  Doing so will provide lower courts
with a ready-made framework for tackling tough cases.  It will make easy cases
easy.  And it will naturally lead the Court to greater precision about which
rights are fundamental or not; it will then be a term of art and part of the
applicable legal standard, rather than a hacky sack tossed around at a casual
balancing party.
In short, this framework fits onto past caselaw relatively well, and consist-
ently applying it will foster clarity that will make judges’ jobs far easier.
B. Clearly Established Unenumerated Rights
Whatever one thinks of the Court’s abstract interpretation of the Due
Process Clause, it seems unenumerated rights are here to stay.  The question
is—how are courts supposed to recognize fundamental but unenumerated
rights?  As we have explained, the Court has based rights’ canonizations on
moral intuition, inferences from enumerated rights, and from history.  It is
this quandary to which we now turn.
The first difficulty is that cataloguing unenumerated rights appears
impractical at best and impossible at worst.  Federalists and Antifederalists
wrestled with this very problem during the debates over the Bill of Rights.
James Wilson observed that in none of the legal or political treatises, “nor in
the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights
appertaining to the people as men and as citizens.”230  James Iredell went
further: “Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he
pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not con-
tained in it.”231  Some critics of enumerated rights argued that if the Consti-
tution was to enumerate every individual right, it would go on “declar[ing]
that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get
up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper” and so on.232
These innumerable natural rights were “retained by the people,”233 but
which of them are so fundamental to our system of ordered liberty as to
implicate the due process of law?
230 The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 415, 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1996) [hereinafter DEBATES] (remarks of James Wilson).
231 The Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution (July 29, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, supra note 230, at 1, 167 (remarks
of James Iredell).
232 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759–60 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Theodore
Sedgwick).
233 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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The second difficulty stems from the first and pertains to the relative
institutional competence for enforcing unenumerated rights.  Grappling
with an analogous problem in the Ninth Amendment context, Justice Scalia
argued that acknowledging the existence of unenumerated rights protected
by the Constitution “is far removed from affirming any one of them, and
even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might
be.”234  In his view, the excavation of unenumerated rights—whether from
the Due Process Clause or some other provision—lends itself to judicial
counterfeiting.  Nothing prevents the Court from smuggling its policy prefer-
ences into the law, and then claiming to have found them in the mire of
morals, inferences, and tradition.  For that reason, Justice Scalia preferred to
have legislatures define the scope of unenumerated rights rather than courts.
Glucksberg offered a partial policing mechanism: making history determi-
native.  History is, of course, somewhat malleable—at least when it comes to
writing opinions.  And history is at least equally malleable when used to inter-
pret enumerated rights. Glucksberg’s approach promised some measure of
guidance that would make rights excavation look more like law than
armchair philosophizing.  It is certainly better than nothing.
But Glucksberg’s approach has a more difficult problem. Glucksberg tells
us to define the right “carefully,” and not too abstractly.  Yet it does not—and
cannot—tell us the proper level of generality.  A recent case in the Tenth
Circuit provides a good example.235  Police arrested and jailed Jerome Daw-
son for violating a restraining order.  Dawson met all the requirements a
judge had set for him to be released on bail.  To release him, the jail had only
one thing left to do: fit him with an ankle bracelet, per the judge’s orders.  As
it happened, though, Dawson paid bail on Friday afternoon.  Because fitting
people with ankle bracelets involved numerous administrative steps, includ-
ing the participation of an outside vendor, the County had a policy that any
person who met bail on Friday afternoon would have to wait until Monday to
get his or her bracelet.  Dawson thus stayed in jail for the weekend and then
sued the County for violating due process.
The question came down to properly defining the scope of the right.
Dawson said the County policy violated his fundamental right to be free from
bodily restraint.236  He argued the jail was in control of the last step necessary
to release him and delayed that step for an entire weekend.  So long as Daw-
son’s definition of the right was correct, he had a strong argument.  The
Supreme Court had suggested many times that freedom from “bodily
restraint” was a fundamental right.237  And that makes intuitive sense, too.  If
“liberty” means anything, it means not being jailed.
234 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 See Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 732 F. App’x 624, 625–31 (10th Cir. 2018).
236 Id. at 636–37 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring).
237 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689–90 (2001) (statute allowed continued
detention past an immigration detainee’s removal period and the Court held there was an
implicit statutory “reasonable time” limitation) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from gov-
ernment custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
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Yet could that be the correct level of generality?  If it was, federal courts
would review bail regulations under strict scrutiny.  That would mean that for
every single county practice that delayed release of someone on bail, the
county would have to show the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.  That result would be surprising, to say
the least.  Not only that, but it might invalidate a whole host of existing bail
regulation.  For example, many small towns across the country likely do not
accept bail payments on weekends, or even after 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
How could they justify this practice?
So it seemed Dawson’s definition couldn’t be right.  But how specifically
should the right be defined?  Was Dawson claiming a right to be fitted with
an ankle bracelet on the weekend?  That definition of the right would seem
too specific.  A concurrence (authored by Chief Judge Tymkovich, one of the
authors of this Article) found Dawson was claiming a right to speedy release
once the jail was in control of the last step needed to comply with a judge’s
order allowing for release on bail.238
A similar problem of specificity arose in another pretrial detention case,
Colbruno v. Kessler.239  There, Christopher Colbruno sued police officers
under § 1983, alleging that during a medical emergency they had unnecessa-
rily walked him nude through public areas of a hospital to his examination
room.  The officers invoked qualified immunity and argued that brief public
exposure was unavoidable because Colbruno had swallowed metal compo-
nents of the emergency call box in his cell and had irretrievably soiled the
smock he was wearing while en route to the hospital.240
The panel majority struggled with the problem of abstraction when
defining Colbruno’s constitutional right.  It ultimately settled on a right to be
free from “a restriction or condition . . . not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal.”241  Although sympathetic to Colbruno’s privacy interests, the dissent
liberty that Clause protects.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (Louisiana stat-
ute allowing continued confinement of insanity acquittee on basis of his antisocial person-
ality violated substantive due process) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (Bail Reform Act’s provision allowing detention of dangerous
defendants so long as certain procedural requirements were met was constitutional under
substantive due process) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is a carefully limited exception.”).
The Supreme Court has “always been careful not to ‘minimize the importance and
fundamental nature’  of the individual’s right to liberty.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750).  The Court has further “said that government detention violates
that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate proce-
dural protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances.’”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746)); see also Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The institutionalization of an adult by
the government triggers heightened, substantive due process scrutiny.”).
238 Dawson, 732 F. App’x at 637 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring).
239 928 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2019).
240 Id. at 1159–60.
241 Id. at 1165 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)).
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(again authored by Chief Judge Tymkovich) would have applied the shocks-
the-conscience test.242  And the facts alleged did not shock the conscience
because there was no allegation of intentional and abusive conduct or puni-
tive intent.243  In addition, the majority had defined the right with far too
much generality.  Absent malicious intent, no clearly established law existed
that could have alerted the officers to Colbruno’s substantive due process
right to privacy in that situation.244
Dawson and Colbruno illustrate the trouble with Glucksberg—it is helpful,
but vague in application.  Could we refine a more helpful test, one that does
not depend so much on judicial discretion?  We think this is possible by
approaching the question from a different angle.
The jurisprudence suggests two things.  First, rather than try to define
abstract rights and then balance them against governmental interests, we
should look to whether the law departs from a settled tradition or norm.
This test does more easily in one step what the Glucksberg tries to do in three.
Glucksberg tries to sever the question into three steps: carefully define the
right, next look at history to see if the right is fundamental, and finally deter-
mine whether the law inappropriately burdens the right.  We propose obviat-
ing the need to define an abstract right or to balance that right against the
government’s interests.  Rather than engaging in those abstract inquiries, we
should ask whether the law clearly departs from a settled tradition or norm
(words that we here use interchangeably).
Shifting the focus from defining rights to identifying relevant traditions
or norms makes sense.  As already discussed, in early America, due process
meant the law of the land—the traditions of the people.  It is easier to look
for what our practice has been in specific contexts, than to try to define
unenumerated rights.  And in any event, it seems likely that a settled tradi-
tion or norm often will be based on some perceived right.
Second, to avoid overly general definitions of norms and traditions, we
think it is sensible to borrow the “clearly established” concept from qualified-
immunity law, which deals with conduct of state officials.  For decades now,
courts apply a simple test before finding state officials liable for constitu-
tional violations: the right violated must be clearly established by prior court
decisions, and the official’s action must have clearly violated that right.  We
can apply a similar test in the realm of unenumerated fundamental rights.
Naturally, when a litigant claims an as-yet unrecognized fundamental right,
there will be no prior court decisions establishing the right.  But we can ask
whether the law clearly violates a settled tradition or norm evident from past
practice and history.  This strict standard is more consistent with the respect
for states that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment by and large
wanted to keep.  And it is far easier for courts to administer because it would
help courts stay away from overly abstract definitions of norms and traditions
242 Id. at 1166–67 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 1167–68.
244 Id. at 1169–70.
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that could be applied differently based on a judge’s prior preconceived
notions.
One question, of course, would be the requirements for a tradition to be
“settled.”  Here we might profitably borrow some guidelines from Professor
William Baude’s treatment of liquidation.245  Professor Baude argues past
practice settles the meaning of ambiguous constitutional text when there has
been a course of deliberate practice and when the question is settled, such
that whatever voices dissented have now acquiesced.  We might apply a simi-
lar concept here: a settled tradition or norm is one that is longstanding,
deliberately chosen or deliberately kept, and widely acknowledged by rele-
vant actors such as founding figures, legislatures, or influential commenta-
tors.  And it must be one that even dissenters have by and large acquiesced
in.
What would this “clear violation of a settled tradition or norm” test look
like in practice?  We think it would look somewhat like the Court’s approach
when it compares state criminal laws to past practice and current practice
among the several states, and (to a lesser extent) like the Court’s approach
when it decides whether a right in the Bill of Rights has been incorpo-
rated.246  In those cases, the Court has not required all states to do as others
do, but has looked for departures from deeply rooted tradition.  Courts
would look for historical examples of legislation like the one at issue.  If there
are lots of examples, we would say the plaintiff has failed to show that the
challenged legislation clearly violated an unenumerated norm.  If the legisla-
tion at issue has few historical analogues, the question becomes whether the
law is inconsistent with widespread practice based on settled traditions or
norms.  If so, then we can say that the plaintiff has shown that the challenged
law violates “the law of the land.”  But the plaintiff should not prevail merely
by showing that many people condemn similar governmental conduct.  If
there is disagreement, then the plaintiff surely has not shown that the law
violates substantive due process.  We must be looking for a tradition or norm
that is so widespread and longstanding that it can be called the settled “law of
the land.”  If the challenged legislation is not clearly inconsistent with such a
tradition or norm, then respect for states and local governments weighs
against finding any violation of substantive due process.
We think this inquiry would better accomplish the precision that Gluck-
sberg aimed for with its instruction to “carefully” define the right.  True, the
proposed inquiry looks somewhat like defining the alleged right as specifi-
245 See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019).
246 See, e.g., Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2020) (analyzing historical
state practices in deciding that Kansas’s variation of the insanity defense to murder did not
violate due process); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (comparing various states’
definitions of murder throughout history); id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating that under the procedural and substantive prongs of
the Due Process Clause, “[i]t is precisely the historical practices that define what is ‘due’”);
see also Timbs v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (applying incorporation doctrine to the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause).
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cally as possible.  But whereas looking for too specific a right can be silly (for
example, asking if there is a fundamental right to obtain an ankle bracelet
over the weekend), it is not silly to ask whether a settled norm applies to that
specific context.  This inquiry is also better in that we skip the step of defin-
ing a right in the abstract at all, and also forego balancing.  So in Dawson’s
case, for example, we would simply ask: Does the County’s rule clearly violate
a settled tradition or norm about bail procedures?  The answer would
depend on whether similar laws exist, and on the relevant practices of jails
across the country and throughout history.  It would further depend on the
extent to which relevant actors have identified a tradition or norm about how
quickly those who post bail should be released.
One could raise several objections to this approach.  One is that it runs
into a level-of-generality problem similar to Glucksberg’s because one still
needs to figure out how abstractly to define a tradition or norm.  But we
think the focus on past practice and the requirement that a law must “clearly
violate” a settled tradition should minimize that problem.  Those guardrails
are absent in the Glucksberg test.
Another objection is that most of the Supreme Court’s decisions vindi-
cating rights involve balancing some identified right against state interests.
In contrast, the method we propose would not so much balance rights and
interests as look for historical practice that relevant actors have recognized as
a tradition or norm.  One answer to this objection is that settled traditions
are a good proxy for unenumerated rights, as traditions will presumably be
based on a balancing of the rights at stake.  But aside from that point, we
submit balancing rights and interests is a test better suited for cases that
involve enumerated rights.  In those cases, courts are given a named right,
and then they ask how far the right extends and how much the government
may interfere with the right.  Balancing is thus one means the Supreme
Court has used to define the contours of a right in particular circumstances.
That endeavor is unnecessary when we are no longer defining the reach of
an abstract right.  Additionally, when the rights at issue are unenumerated,
the subjectivity of the balancing approach is especially unwelcome.  For in
those cases, courts have discretion to name the right too.  We think the
approach suggested here involves less subjectivity than first defining a right
writ large, and then balancing the right.
Some might also counter that few of the substantive due process rights
now existing would pass muster under this test.  That might well be true, but
that does not mean the test is not the best one for lower courts (and state
courts) going forward.  Most courts do not have a high-caliber “Supreme
Court bar” to fill them in on all the ramifications of discovering a particular
“fundamental” right.  What courts can do, however, is place the burden on
the plaintiff to show that the challenged legislation clearly violates a long-
standing and settled tradition or norm.
As an example, consider the patriots during the American Revolution.
They thought the British Parliament had violated the “law of the land”
because Parliament’s “Intolerable Acts” had broken a longstanding, tradi-
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tional norm—trial by a jury of one’s peers—the deviation from which British
citizens had universally condemned.247  That is the sort of substantive due
process inquiry courts can best undertake when evaluating legislative action,
and the kind of inquiry that suffers the least temptation to judicial creativity.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we wish to indulge in a bit of hyperbole.  After King
Minos of Crete defeated the Athenians in battle (thus avenging his son), he
imposed sadistic terms.  Every seven years, he required the Athenians to sacri-
fice seven maidens and seven young men to the Minotaur.  The Minotaur,
besides being a formidable monster, lived in a labyrinth.  No one who
entered his lair could ever find his way out.  Ariadne, Minos’s daughter, was
keeper of the labyrinth.  One day, Theseus, son of King Aegeus, volunteered
to deliver the Athenians from the oppression they so long had borne.  As
happened so often in Greek myths, Ariadne instantly fell in love with the
future hero.  Slaying the Minotaur would, of course, be a worthy feat, but if
Theseus could not find his way out of the labyrinth, he would die alongside
the Minotaur.  So Ariadne devised a plan; she gave Theseus a golden cord,
which he was to lay down as he entered the labyrinth and follow back out.
The cord saved Theseus’s life.
If we may be allowed an exaggerated metaphor, we suggest that the
Supreme Court has acted much like a heedless, cordless Theseus.  In case
after case, the Court has stormed into the labyrinth to slay whatever state
oppression it found intolerable.  But unlike Theseus, the Court has not had
to find its way out of the labyrinth.  The Court has simply cleared its desk of
all remnants of that case and moved on to the next Term.  It is the lower
courts that have been left without hope of escape.  We must follow the Court
to the place where it has slain the latest Minotaur, but we have no cord with
which to retrace the Court’s steps.
In this Article, we have tried to lay down a cord.  Reviewing the history of
due process—from before the American Revolution to the twentieth cen-
tury—reveals the many twists and turns the doctrine has taken.  From that
history, we have tried to map a way out of the labyrinth.  Our approach here
has not been revolutionary; we have not tried to knock down any of the laby-
rinth’s walls, nor have we tried to revive any dead monsters therein.  Instead,
we have categorized the Court’s cases in a way that we think makes sense and
which can help courts with difficult cases going forward.
In sum, we propose the Court adopt a clear framework for addressing
the vast universe of due process claims.  Those claims may be divided into
claims against the legislature, claims against executive officials, and claims
against judicial action.  Different standards do (or should) govern each of
those categories.  The legislative process does not constitute the “process that
is due” when legislation has no rational basis at all, when it is too vague to be
reasonable, when it infringes a fundamental right without a compelling rea-
247 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 9, at 1700–01.
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son and narrowly tailored means, or when it enacts unfair procedures (either
in the civil or criminal realm).  Executive officials fail to provide the “process
that is due” when they deprive persons of life, liberty, or property in con-
science-shocking ways.  And state courts fail to provide the “process that is
due” when they provide unfair procedures or when they render arbitrary
decisions affecting the life, liberty, or property of the parties before them.
We have also proposed a few things within the legislative and executive
parts of that framework.  Within the shocks-the-conscience framework, courts
should develop more specific tests that outline what kind of conduct shocks
the conscience in particular contexts (for example, what factors combine to
shock the conscience when a state official uses his authority to wrongfully
remove someone’s child), and courts should also clarify that existing stand-
alone tests are mere iterations of the shocks-the-conscience approach.
Within the framework for claims against the legislature, we have argued that
the standard for identifying “fundamental rights” should be wholly
revamped.  We should stop struggling with the near-impossible task of identi-
fying a right that bears the Goldilocks-level of specificity.  Instead, we should
require plaintiffs to show that legislation has clearly violated a longstanding,
settled norm.  The above framework, we think, would reduce the reign of
confusion that has long ruled substantive due process, and due process in
general.
We also hope the reader sees something more.  These cases have
become political battles, ones that destroy boundaries and fence posts that
would otherwise guide courts.  Above, we have described numerous examples
of this phenomenon.  Our hope is that the reader sees how poorly politics
looks in the judicial sphere and how perniciously it affects courts’ consis-
tency.  This Article is a call not so much for theorizing as for problem solving.
Our hope is to spawn further brainstorming as to common-sense, easier-to-
apply approaches to the Due Process Clause.  Perhaps in that way we might
restore the clarity and consistency necessary to principled adjudication, with-
out which there can be no justice.
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